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I. JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction in this matter is conferred upon this court 
by Article VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution of Utah; Utah Code 
Ann. Section 78-2-2 (1953); and Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
I. NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Scott Gourdin is appealing from a directed verdict which 
limited his recovery to the remedies of the Worker's Compensation 
Act. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. Whether the court committed error in granting the directed 
verdict. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court's standard of review of a directed verdict is 
the same as that imposed upon the trial court. We must 
examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
losing party, and if there is a reasonable basis in the 
evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom that 
would support a judgment in favor of the losing party, 
the directed verdict cannot be sustained. 
Management Committee of Graystone Pines Homeowners 
Association v. Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 898 
(Utah 1982). 
B. Whether gratuitous servants, such as Scott Gourdin, 
at the time of the injury, are not employees as a matter of 
law for purposes of the Worker's Compensation Act. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The question presented being one of law, this Court need 
not defer to the trial court's interpretation of the 
statute. 
Asay v. Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1988). 
C. Whether the inclusion of gratuitous servants under the 
Worker's Compensation Act would undermine the public policy of 
the Act. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The question presented being one of law, this Court need not 
defer to the trial court's interpretation of the statute. 
Asay v. Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1988). 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES WHOSE 
INTERPRETATIONS ARE DETERMINATIVE 
Utah Code Annotated (1991) 35-1-42(2) 
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U.C.A. Section 5-1-43(1) 
U.C.A. Section 35-1-57 
U.C.A. Section 35-1-60 
U.C.A. Section 35-l-75(1) (e) and (f) and (2) 
U.C.A. Section 49-5-103(11) 
U.C.A. Scetion 67-20-1 
U.C.A. Section 67-20-2 
U.C.A. Section 67-20-3 
U.C.A. Section 67-20-4 
U.C.A. Section 67-20-6 
U.C.A. Section 67-20-7 
Utah Rule of Evidence 201(b)(1) 
(See Addendum A for full text of statutes) 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for negligence based upon injuries received 
by Scott Gourdin while mowing a lawn at Sharon's Cultural 
Educational Recreation Association (SCERA) on June 21, 1985. Scott 
was a seven year old child. His father was the manager of the 
grounds for SCERA. At issue is whether Scott's access to SCERA 
facilities constitutes income so as to make Scott an employee of 
SCERA for purposes of worker's compensation. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff initially brought this action against SCERA, the 
owner of the property where Scott was mowing a lawn, Cutler's Cycle 
& Mower, which sold the power lawn mower to SCERA, and Toro, the 
manufacturer of the lawn mower. These parties brought in the 
wholesaler, Turf Equipment Company, and Paul Gourdin, Scott's 
father, who was SCERA's manager. At the time of trial, all parties, 
with the exception of SCERA and Scott, had settled. 
C. DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
On August 8, 1990, the third day of a jury trial after 
plaintiff rested, the trial court directed verdict in favor of SCERA 
based upon the Workers Compensation Act. The court held it was 
Scott Gourdin's exclusive remedy. Trial Transcript (Transcript p. 
508. ) 
D. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On June 21, 1985, SCERA was a not-for-profit Utah 
corporation located in Orem, Utah. (Transcript at pp. 367-368.) 
2. On June 21, 1985, SCERA was a statutory employer as 
defined by the Worker's Compensation Act. (Trial Transcript at pp. 
4 
504, 507-508.) 
3. Three categories of workers worked at SCERA, full-time 
paid employees, part-time paid employees and volunteers. 
Transcript at pp. 300, 368-369.) 
4. Full-time and part-time employees received wages and the 
right to complementary use of the pool, shell (outdoor theater), 
and movie theater for themselves and their families. (Transcript 
at pp. 368-369, 501-503) 
5. Volunteers were given complimentary passes for themselves, 
families, and a friend to use SCERA facilities, as well as discounts 
when buying items from SCERA. (Transcript at pp. 498-499.) 
6. The benefits volunteers received were given as "an 
incentive to get them to work." (Transcript at p. 503). 
7. On June 21, 1985, Paul Gourdin, Scott's father, was a 
part-time paid management employee responsible for the maintenance 
and custodial care of the movie theater and its grounds. 
(Transcript at pp. 301, 368). 
8. Paul Gourdin had authority to hire whomever he wanted to. 
(Transcript at pp. 340, 341). 
9. Scott used the SCERA facilities as a direct result of 
Paul's employment by SCERA. (Transcript at pp. 500, 502-503.) 
10. On June 21, 1985, Scott was performing volunteer work 
under the direction and control of the SCERA manager responsible for 
the care and upkeep of the grounds. (Transcript at pp. 301-304, 
5 
318. ) 
11. The power lawn mower Scott was operating on 21 June, 1985, 
was owned, controlled, and used under the direction of SCERA. 
(Transcript at pp. 301-304.) 
12. Scott was injured while working as a volunteer employee on 
June 21, 1985. (Transcript at p. 304.) 
13. At the time Scott was injured he was not a regular 
employee of SCERA. (Transcript at pp. 317-318, 373). 
14. Scott received only the promise of theater passes for his 
services to SCERA rendered on or before June 21, 1985. (Transcript 
at pp. 500, 502, 505. ) 
15. Scott had unlimited access to SCERA facilities whether he 
worked or not. (Transcript at p. 310). 
16. SCERA prepared an Employer's First Report of Injury 
(injury report), for submission to the Industrial Commission of 
Utah for the accident. (Transcript at p. 482.) 
17. SCERA did not submit the injury report. (Transcript at p. 
482. ) 
18. On June 21, 1985, the president of SCERA, Norman 
Nielsen, was the individual responsible for submitting the injury 
report. (Transcript at p. 482.) 
19. Norman Nielsen has never signed the injury report. 
(Transcript at p. 483.) 
20. SCERA policy requires applicants for all positions to 
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fill out an application. (Transcript at p. 369.) 
21. Scott did not fill out a SCERA work application. 
(Transcript at pp. 370, 371.) 
VI. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court directed a verdict against Scott Gourdin 
ruling that his exclusive remedy was under the Worker's Compensation 
Act. The issue was whether or not he was an employee for purposes 
of the Worker's Compensation Act. if Scott had been a statutory 
employee, the Act was his exclusive remedy. 
In reviewing a directed verdict, the court must view all 
evidence, and the inferences which reasonably flow from it, in the 
light most favorable to the disadvantaged party. The evidence 
showed that Scott occasionally worked for SCERA in the usual course 
of its business, and under the direction and control of its 
authorized agent. His compensation consisted primarily of the 
promise of free theater passes. 
The Worker's Act explicitly defines statutory employment to 
consist of three factors: 1) regular employment; 2) work in the 
usual course of the business; and 3) employment under a "contract 
of hire." A "contract of hire" consists of a "contract of 
employment" plus valuable compensation. All three factors must be 
7 
present for statutory employment. 
The evidence demonstrates that Scott fails two of the three 
requirements for statutory employment. Scott was not regularly 
employed. Because no valuable compensation was promised or given, 
there was no "contract of hire." Scott was, therefore, not an 
employee for purposes of the Worker's Act, and not entitled to its 
benefits, nor limited to its remedies. 
II. The trial court was trying to determine Scott's 
relationship to SCERA when it incorrectly entered the directed 
verdict determining Scott to be a statutory employee. The trial 
courtf s confusion is understandable when the range of options 
available to it are reviewed; trespasser, licensee, invitee and 
statutory employee. 
Scott was acting under the direction and control of SCERA when 
he was injured, and so was not a trespasser, licensee or invitee. 
However, because he did not work regularly, and received no valuable 
compensation, he was not an employee. 
Other jurisdictions have developed a category which defines and 
explains voluntary employment: gratuitous servant. Gratuitous 
servants may work: 1) regularly; and 2) in the usual course of 
the business; but there is no "contract of hire" because the 
"contract of employment" is not supported by valuable compensation. 
This defines Scott's relationship with SCERA. 
8 
For seventy years, Utah Courts have required "contracts of 
hire" before finding statutory employment, and have expressly 
required the payment of wages to create "contracts of hire." The 
express adoption of the category of "gratuitous servant" will 
clarify a relationship which has been somewhat confused in Utah. 
III. It is contrary to the public policy of the State of Utah 
to extend the coverage of the Worker's Act to gratuitous servants. 
The Worker's Act itself defines "employee" in exclusive and not 
illustrative terms. The courts have treated the Worker's Act as 
exclusive through its analysis of employment relationships for 
seventy years. The legislature has also treated the Worker's Act as 
exclusive. In 1983 Worker's Act coverage was explicitly extended to 
limited groups of volunteer government workers who otherwise would 
not be entitled to the benefits of the Act. 
Extension of Worker's Act coverage to volunteers may have a 
significant impact on organizations which rely upon the labor of 
volunteers. Record keeping burdens, plus premiums, could reduce the 
work many charitable organizations are willing to do. The 
Industrial Commission will also likely have to deal with a greatly 
increased work load. The law should require that gratuitous 
servants continue to be excluded from Worker's Act coverage. 
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VII. ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DIRECTED VERDICT WAS NOT SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE 
A* If there is a reasonable basis in the evidence and in the 
inference to be drawn therefrom that would support a judgment in 
favor of the losing party, the directed verdict cannot be sustained. 
This appeal has been brought as a result of a directed 
verdict rendered in favor of SCERA. (Transcript at p. 508). The 
verdict was based upon a finding by the court that Scott Gourdin 
(Scott), was an employee for purposes of the Worker's 
Compensation Act (Worker's Act), and that his sole remedy is under 
the Act. (Id). 
A court may direct a verdict if there is no disagreement as to 
the facts of the case and the logical inferences which can be drawn 
from those facts. In Management Committee of Graystone Pines, Inc. 
v. Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982), the trial court 
directed a verdict, and by doing so decided questions as to the 
existence and extent of construction warranties, whether the 
10 
corporate defendant was an alter ego, and whether plaintiffs relied 
upon the warranty, all questions of fact. The court in Graystone 
Pines vacated and remanded for new trial, holding that: 
The Court's standard of review of a directed verdict is 
the same as that imposed upon the trial court. We must 
examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
losing party, and if there is a reasonable basis in the 
evidence, and in the inference to be drawn therefrom that 
would support a judgment in favor of the losing party, the 
directed verdict cannot be sustained. 652 P.2d at 898. 
Accord Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. v. Chapman, 699 
P.2d, 766, 768 (Utah 1985); 
The directed verdict in this proceeding was improperly 
entered if the evidence and the inferences which can properly 
be drawn from it, as viewed most favorably for Scott, are 
contrary to that verdict. 
B. The evidence must show Scott was a statutory employee 
to support the directed verdict. 
Th€i trial court ruled that Scott was a statutory employee 
of SCERA. This ruling was based upon sections 42(2) and 43(1) 
of Title 35, chapter 1 of the Utah Code, the Worker's 
Compensation Act. Section 35-1-42(2) reads as follows: 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), each person, 
including each public utility ar.d each independent 
contractor, who regularly employs one or more workers or 
operatives in the same business, or in or about the same 
establishment, under any contract of hire, express or 
implied, oral or written, is considered an employer under 
this title. As used in the subsection: (a) "Regularly" 
11 
includes all employments in the usual course of the trade, 
business, profession, or occupation of the employer, 
whether continuous throughout the year or for only a 
portion of the year. 
(b) "Independent contractor" means any person engaged 
in the performance of any work for another who, while so 
engaged, is independent of the employer in all that 
pertains to the execution of the work, is not subject to 
the rule or control of the employer, is engaged only in 
the performance of a definite job or piece of work, and is 
subordinate to the employer only in effecting a result in 
accordance with the employer's design. 
This section sets out the limits of statutory employment, 
as viewed from the employer's perspective. To be a statutory 
employer, the business must: 
1) Regularly employ one or more workers; 
2) Employ the workers in its usual business; and 
3) Have a "contract of hire" with the employee(s), whether 
oral or written, express or implied." 
Section 35-1-43(1) is the employee counterpart to section 
35-1-42(2), and reads in material part: 
(1) As used in this chapter "employee," "worker" or 
"workmen," and "operative" mean: 
(b) each person in the service of any employer, as 
defined in Section 35-1-42, who employs one or more 
workers or operatives regularly in the same business, or 
in or about the same establishment, under any contract of 
12 
hire, express or implied, oral or written, including 
aliens and minors, whether legally or illegally working 
for hire, but not including any person whose employment is 
casual and not in the usual course of the trade, business, 
or occupation of his employer. 
To be a statutory employee, a worker must: 
1) Regularly work in the business; 
2) Work in or about the same establishment; and 
3) Work subject to a "contract of hire", whether oral or 
written, express or implied." 
Determining whether Scott was a statutory employee is 
central to this appeal. He is entitled to no remedy other than 
that available under the Worker's Act if he was a statutory 
employee. U.C.A. section 35-1-60 reads in material part: 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the 
provisions of this title for injuries sustained by an 
employee . . . shall be the exclusive remedy against the 
employer . . . 
If Scott were a statutory employee, he may recover against 
his employer as of right, but only to the extent of the 
remedies provided by the Worker's Act. Conversely, if Scott 
were not a statutory employee, he has no rights under the 
Worker's Act, and may only proceed civilly against the business 
where he was injured. His right to bring the action is 
determined by whether or not he was a statutory employee of 
SCERA on June 21, 1985 when he was injured. (Transcript at p. 
508). 
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C. Scott was not a statutory employee when injured. 
1. Scott was a SCERA volunteer worker. 
On June 21, 1985, Paul Gourdin (Paul), was the SCERA 
manager in charge of the theater grounds, maintenance, and 
hiring. (Transcript at pp. 301,367). On that day, Paul asked 
Scott Gourdin to mow the SCERA lawn using a power mower. 
(Transcript of pp. 301-304). While using the mower, Scott was 
injured. (Transcript at p. 304). Every worker was required to 
fill out an application before starting to work for SCERA. 
(Transcript at p. 369). However, Scott Gourdin never had 
filled out an application. (Transcript at p. 371). 
At the time of Scott's injury, there were two types of 
SCERA workers: paid employees and volunteers. (Transcript at 
pp. 368-369). Paid employees received wages or salary and 
complimentary use of the pool, shell and movie theater for 
themselves and their families. (Transcript at pp. 325, 
501-502). The benefits given to volunteers were a right to 
complimentary passes for themselves and either their families 
or a friend, and discounts for items purchased at or through 
SCERA. (Transcript at pp. 498-499). 
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The record is clear Scott did not receive any compensation 
or direct benefit for his volunteer work. However, he did have 
complimentary use of the facilities as a result of his father's 
part-time employment by SCERA. (Transcript at pp. 500-504). 
After the injury, an industrial accident report was filled out 
by SCERA, but it was not submitted to the Industrial 
Commission. (Transcript at p. 482-483). 
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Scott, 
shows that Scott was hired as a SCERA volunteer and functioned 
as a SCERA volunteer worker. 
2. The evidence presented by SCERA demonstrated that 
Scott was not a statutory employee. 
Throughout the history of the Worker's Act and its 
predecessor, the Industrial Act, courts have had to determine 
when a statutory employment relationship existed which triggered 
the provisions and limitations of the acts. In Rockefeller v. 
Industrial Commission, 58 Utah 124, 197 P. 1038(1921), a widow 
had applied to the Industrial Commission for compensation when 
her husband died while driving a taxi cab. The Industrial 
Commission found that decedent had been, in fact, a statutory 
employee, and awarded the widow compensation. The employer 
appealed, contending that he was not a statutory employer and 
that no "contract of hire" had existed between himself and 
decedent. The Court, in holding for the employer, set out the 
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appropriate standard of review, stating that: 
[W]hether an alleged agreement amounts to a contract of 
employment may, under certain circumstances, be a mixed 
question of law and fact, and under different 
circumstances may be purely a question of law. If the 
whole agreement respecting the alleged employment is in 
writing, the question of whether it constitutes a contract 
of hire within the provisions of the Industrial Act is 
purely a question of law. If, upon the other hand, it is 
not so evidenced and the agreement rests in parol, or 
partly in parol, or is to be implied or inferred from the 
facts and circumstances and what was said between the 
parties, then the jury must find the facts, and, when 
found, the court must, nevertheless, determine whether the 
facts so found constitute a contract. And, lastly, if, as 
in the case at bar, the facts respecting the employment 
are not in dispute, the question of whether the agreement 
constitutes a contract of employment is again one of law, 
and must be determined by the court. 197 P. at 1039-1040. 
The jury must decide whether Scott was a statutory employee 
if the facts are in dispute. However, when there is no 
disagreement as to the facts, but only as to their effect, the 
court should therefore decide the issue as a matter of law. 
There is no dispute in the record as to the material facts 
which apply to determining whether Scott was a statutory 
employee. Statutory employment is based upon regular 
employment, employment is the regular course of business, and 
contract of hire. 
a. Regular employment. 
Scott was not regularly employed by SCERA. Norman Nielsen, 
President of SCERA, testified that he never saw Scott work, 
although Scott frequently came to the SCERA with his father. 
(Transcript at pp. 372-374). 
Paul Gourdin (Paul), is Scott's father and the manager who 
asked hirn to mow the lawn the day he was injured. (Transcript 
at 302-3(34). Paul also testified that Scott helped on an 
irregular or casual basis. (Transcript at pp. 317-318, 373). 
The evidence of defendant and plaintiff is consistent in 
establishing that Scott was not a regular worker. As a matter 
of law Scott cannot be a statutory employee (U.C.A. 
35-l-43(1)(b)). Therefore, he has no right to the remedies of 
the Worker's Act, and is not limited to the Act as his 
exclusive remedy. 
b. Scott worked in the regular course of SCERA's 
business. 
Scott claims, and SCERA does not now, and never has, 
denied that he was injured while performing a job which was 
regularly done by SCERA employees. (Transcript at 301, 302). 
Scott meets this requirement for being a statutory employee. 
c. No "contract of hire" existed between Scott and 
SCERA. 
A "contract of hire" is the third requirement for statutory 
employment under the Worker's Act (See U.C.A. 35-1-42(2) and 
43(l)(b)). A "contract of hire" may be "express or implied, 
oral or written", but it must exist and is not presumed to be 
present. Rockefeller, 197 P. at 1039. 
The facts are not in dispute. SCERA policy requires for 
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every worker, whether full-time, part-time or volunteer, to 
fill out a written application (Transcript at p. 369) Scott 
never filled out an application (Transcript at p. 371), but he 
was considered an employee, (Transcript at p. 317), however, he 
was not paid, nor eligible for a wage from SCERA. On direct 
examination by counsel for SCERA, Norman Nielsen, President of 
SCERA, stated that "the benefits [for volunteers] included free 
passes to the SCERA Theater, for themselves and their immediate 
family, and, of course, the value of that was directly related 
to the size of the family." (Transcript at p. 498). Scott 
received no monetary compensation for his work. (Transcript at 
pp. 500, 502 and 503). He only had the right to receive 
theater passes. (Transcript at pp. 504-505). 
Wages are necessary to support a "contract of hire." In 
Board of Education of Alpine School District v. Olsen, 
684 P.2d 49 (Utah 1984), the school district appealed from a 
ruling by the Industrial Commission that petitioner Olsen was a 
statutory employer and entitled to compensation for injuries 
sustained while working at a high school. This Court 
reversed. It said: 
The Court has articulated several factors to be considered 
in establishing whether an employment relationship 
exists. The cases have concerned independent contractors 
primarily, but the same principles apply. An employee is 
hired and paid a salary or wage, works under the direction 
of the employer, and is subject to the employer's 
control. We have also considered the intent of the 
parties, and the business of the employer. 684 P.2d at 
52. (Citations omitted). (Emphasis added). 
The need for payment of wages or salaries to support a 
"contract of hire" has been a well understood requirement for 
over seventy years in Utah. See, also, Murray v. Wasatch 
Grading Co., 73 Utah 430, 274 P.940, 943 (1929); and Weber 
County-Ogden City R. Com, v. Industrial Commission, 93 Utah 85 
71 P.2d 177, 181(1937); (both cases assume wages are 
fundamental to employment); and Fuller Brush Co. v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 99 Utah 97, 104 P.2d 201, 204 (1940); 
Blamires v. Board of Review, 584 P.2d 889 (Utah 1978); Adele's 
Housekeeping, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 757 
P.2d 480, 482 (Utah App. 1988); these cases rely upon the 
definition of "contract of hire" developed by the Industrial 
Commission. 
It is undisputed that no written contract existed between 
Scott and SCERA, nor did Scott receive monetary compensation or 
anything else other than a right to receive theater passes from 
SCERA for his labor. Since, as the court held in Olsen, there 
can be no "contract of hire" without wages, no "contract of 
hire" existed between Scott and SCERA. 
A directed verdict on the issue of statutory employment is 
proper if the evidence, as seen in the light most favorable to 
Scott, supports all three elements of statutory employment. 
However, the directed verdict was improper because the evidence 
shows that Scott did not regularly work for SCERA, and that a 
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"contract of hire" did not exist. The lack of either regular 
employment or "contract of hire" element is enough to bar a 
finding of statutory employment, and with the failure of two 
elements (as shown by the evidence SCERA presented), statutory 
employment did not exist for Scott on June 21, 1985. The 
verdict should be vacated and this case should be remanded with 
an instruction to the trial court that Scott was not, and could 
not have been, a statutory employee. 
POINT II 
THE EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY OF GRATUITOUS SERVANT 
SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED 
A. Scott was a gratuitous servant. 
The directed verdict was partially based upon a 
misunderstanding of Worker's Act coverage. However, the 
directed verdict was also due to confusion as to how to 
classify Scott in this situation. (Transcript at p. 508). As 
discussed in Point I, Scott was not a statutory worker, because 
he was not a regular worker and was without a "contract of 
hire" because there was no valuable compensation. 
Moreover, there are other classifications which do not 
accurately describe Scott. U.C.A. 35-1-43(2)(b) identifies the 
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category of independent contractor. It provides in material 
part: 
[A]ny person engaged in the performance of any work ... 
not subject to the rule or control of the employer. 
In Fuller Brush Co. v. Industrial Commission, 99 Utah 97, 104 
P.2d 201 (1940), an unemployment case, the court specifically 
addressed the distinction between independent contractors and 
statutory employees. The court reasoned that in order for an 
independent contractor relationship to exist there must be 
compensation paid which is not a wage for service, but rather a 
commission paid for results. 104 P.2d at 203-204. Also, 
independent contractors are free of the control and direction of 
their employer in the performance of their duties. 
Scott was not paid at all (Transcript at 500, 502, and 503), 
and no mention of compensation for achieving a goal was ever made. 
Scott was also under the direction and control of the SCERA manager 
in the performance of the work. (Transcript at 301-304). Scott was 
therefore not an independent contractor. 
Neither was he strictly a "volunteer." In Board of Education 
of Alpine School District v. Olsen, 684 P.2d 49 (Utah 1984), the 
court, in concluding that the carpenter was a volunteer and not 
entitled to benefits under the Worker's Act, said: 
In the present case, Olsen received no compensation for 
helping in shop classes. He was brought in as an RSVP 
volunteer. The lunch tickets were not provided by the 
school district, but by RSVP. The school district had no 
control over his hours or any other aspect of his 
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volunteer work. There is no evidence that he or the school 
district intended to establish an employment relationship, even 
an informal one. Olsen operated his own residential 
construction business, and from the record it appears that most 
of the carpentry work he performed as a "volunteer" was in fact 
for his business, 684 P.2d at 52. 
Although Scott was uncompensated (Transcript at 500, 502-
503), as was Mr. Olsen, he was, unlike Olsen, under SCERA's 
direction and control in performing work for SCERA (Transcript at 
301-304). The service Scott was performing also directly benefitted 
SCERA as it was in the usual course of SCERAfs business. 
(Transcript at pp. 301-302) Scott was therefore not a volunteer. 
Additionally, Scott could not have been an invitee, licensee 
or trespasser, because he was acting as a servant under SCERAfs 
direction and control (Transcript at 301-304). How, then, could 
his position be defined? 
Professor Arthur Larson, in his treatise on worker's 
compensation, Larson's Workmen's Compensation (1990), defines 
individuals such as Scott as "gratuitous servants". In 1C 
Larson's Workmen's Compensation section 47.00(c), he states that: 
Gratuitous servants are not employees, since the element 
of "hire" [sic] is lacking; but payment may be found in 
anything of value, such as board and lodging, and an 
agreement to pay is usually implied when the parties have 
omitted to make an express agreement on payment. 1C 
Larson's at 8-284. 
Hire is equivalent, then, to a promise to pay valuable 
compensation. Gratuitous servants have no such promise. This 
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definition fits Scott. His compensation, if there was any, was 
soley a promise of complimentary tickets (which were never given), 
(Transcript at 498-499, 500, 502-503). However, there was no 
"contract of hire". (See Point I above). Scott must therefore have 
been a gratuitous servant. 
B. "Gratuitous servant" is a useful and practical description 
of actual relationships. 
Why some workers should be classified as gratuitous servants 
was explained by Dr. Larson in part as follows: 
There is also a sound reason for the requirement that the 
employment be "for hire". In a vicarious liability suit, 
payment is not a requisite of servant status, since the 
stranger's rights against the master could not possibly be 
affected by the presence or absence of financial 
arrangements between the master and servant. But in a 
compensation case, the philosophy of the legislation 
assumes that the worker is in a gainful occupation at the 
time of injury. The essence of compensation protection is 
the restoration of a part of the loss of wages, which are 
assumed to have existed. Merely as a practical matter, it 
would be impossible to calculate compensation benefits for 
a purely gratuitous worker, since benefits are ordinarily 
calculated on the basis of earnings. 1C Larson's section 
47.10 at 8-291 to 8-292. (Emphasis added) 
Not treating gratuitous workers as if they were statutory 
employees simply makes good common sense. No "contract of hire" 
exists between the master and themselves, as there is no wage. 
Without wages, there is no real basis upon which to award 
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compensation. If Scott's wage were assumed to be complimentary 
movie passes, would 40 weeks of passes be adequate compensation 
for a permanent or partial disability? This result might be 
arrived at by application of U.C.A. Section 35-l-75(1)(e) 
entitled Average Weekly Wage—basis of computation. Section 
35-1-75(1)(f) does not apply because the "wages" were "fixed", 
ie., complimentary tickets for the work. Merely stating the 
proposition exposes its absurdness. A gratuitous worker simply 
can not be treated as if he were a statutory employer for 
compensation, since he can, by definition, receive none. 
C. Numerous jurisdictions recognize the gratuitous 
servant type of relationship. 
The 'gratuitous servant' relationship has been found to be 
a useful tool in examining Worker's compensation claims by 
courts in numerous jurisdictions. Courts in New York, 
California, Pennsylvania, New Mexico, Colorado and others have 
developed a category of this type to determine whether claims 
properly come within their own states' compensation laws. 
In Edwards v. Hollywood Canteen, 160 P.2d 94 (Cal. App. 
1945), aff'd 167 P.2d 729 (Cal 1946), plaintiff Edwards was a 
radio starlet acting as an unpaid hostess for the Hollywood 
Canteen during World War II. She was injured while dancing 
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with a boisterous Marine. The trial court determined that she 
was not an employee for purposes of Worker's Compensation. 
The Court of Appeals said that while Edwards was an 
employee: 
It is equally clear that if respondent had sought 
industrial compensation through the commission she would 
have been required to prove that she was serving under an 
"appointment or contract of hire". . • Having no 
"contract of hire" her cause must rest upon the fact of 
her rendering actual service gratuitously for her employer. 
160 P.2d at 99. 
The court further clarified the difference between 
gratuitous service and statutory employment by stating that: 
While paying is not necessary to render one a master, yet 
paying is necessary to bring an employee within the 
workmen's compensation act. 160 P.2d at 101. 
The California Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the 
lower courts. 
The distinction between gratuitous servants and employees 
explained by the Edwards courts has been relied upon by many 
courts in other jurisdictions. In Ferro v. Leopold Sinsheimer 
Estate, 256 N.Y. 398, 176 N.E. 817(1931), a thirteen year old 
boy was asked by the building superintendent to clean the 
elevator cables with a kerosene soaked rag while the elevator 
was operating. The boy had performed errands for pocket change 
for the superintendent in the past, and was paid 9 cents for 
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this job. The boy's hand was badly injured when the elevator 
reversed directions. At that time the New York workmen's 
compensation statute reached all employees under 'contracts of 
hire' for wages. 176 N.E. at 818. The lower court directed a 
verdict against the boy, concluding that "the plaintiff has an 
exclusive remedy under the provisions of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act." Id. In reversing the lower court, the New 
York Court of Appeals said that: 
The circumstances disclose that the relationship of 
employment was not contemplated or established . . . 
[because] [g]ratuities or tips received by employees 
cannot be considered as wages, unless so understood by the 
parties in making the contract of employment. 176 N.E. at 
818. 
In Harris v. Seiavitch, 336 Pa. 294, 9 A.2d 375 (1939), a 
milk truck driver promised a boy "something" for riding on his 
tail gate to keep other children off the back, and to prevent 
anyone from taking bottles of milk. The boy lost his left leg 
when the driver backed into a pole. The boy was successful in 
obtaining a jury verdict. The defendant appealled. The 
Pennsylvania worker's compensation statute is somewhat broader than 
the Worker's Act of Utah, as it reaches all master-servant 
relationships which are covered by a contract of employment. 9 A.2d 
at 376. Even so, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the jury 
verdict. The court said: 
Here the lower court found that the evidence merely 
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established a promise of a gift or gratuity and there was 
no contract for wages. 9 A.2d at 376. See also Marcus v. 
Frankfort Hospital, 445 Pa. 206, 283 A.2d 69 (1971); 
Stewart v. Urye, 237 Pa. Super 258, 352 A.2d 465 (1975) 
In Jelso v. World Balloon Corp., 97 N.M. 164, 637 P.2d 846 
(N.M. App. 1981), plaintiff Jelso was injured while helping 
defendant inflate a balloon. Plaintiff had been laid off the 
day prior to the injury by defendant, but helped defendant on 
the day of the injury in order to gain experience. Moreover, 
she claimed she was paid by being offered refreshments. The 
court first quoted Larson on Workmen's Compensation with regard 
for the need of wages or payment to establish a contract of 
hire. (See Addendum D) The court then said: 
A volunteer gives services voluntarily and gratuitously, 
without any express or implied promise of remuneration in 
return, and in general is not entitled to the benefits of 
workmen's compensation laws. 
637 P.2d at 851. 
The same reasoning was applied to a carpenter injured 
while working to satisfy a pledge to a church (Fernquist v. San 
Francisco Presbytery, 152 Cal. App. 2d 405, 313 P.2d 192 
(1957); a hospital Blue Lady who received free meals (Hall v. 
State Compensation Insurance Fund, 154 Colo. 47, 387 P.2d 899 
(1963)(en banc)); a casual employee injured while shooting 
fireworks, for which he received no special compensation (Uhe 
v. Central States Theater Corp., 258 Iowa 580 139 N.W.2d 538 
(1966)); a civil defense volunteer injured in the course of his 
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duties (Ferrell v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 79 Ariz 
278, 288 P.2d 492 (1955)); a volunteer hostess at a real estate 
promotion (Freedman v. Wolfswinkel, 19 Ariz App. 307 (1973)); a 
minor injured while cleaning a sausage maker for a "little 
change" (Brock v. Bower, 376 Pa. 209, 102 A.2d 121 (1954)); a 
college football player on scholarship injured during practice 
(Rensing v. Indiana St. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 444 N.E.2d 1170 
(Ind. 1983)); and an inmate injured while making license plates 
for eight cents an hour (Frederick v. Men's Reformatory, 203 
N.W.2d 797 (Iowa 1973). 
State courts have found statutory employment in the 
following cases: Barragan v. W.C.A.B., 240 Cal. Rptr. 811 (Cal 
App. 1987), a student nurse injured while performing internship 
for both essential graduation and professional training; 
Flamingo Motor Inn v. Industrial Commission, 133 Ariz 200, 650 
P.2d 502 (1982), an off duty part-time employee injured while 
moving furniture for drinks; Killebrew v. Indus. Commission, 65 
Ariz 163, 176 P.2d 925 (1947), a rancher injured while 
assisting hay bailer in exchange for valuable services; Johnson 
v. Industrial Commission, 88 Ariz. 354, 356 P.2d 1021 (1960), 
an inmate injured while working for sentence reduction and 
snacks; and Scott v. State Ace. Insurance Fund, 42 Ore App. 
595, 600 P.2d 967 (Ore. App. 1979), a rancher injured while 
returning his own cattle to range provided as partial 
28 
compensation for employment. 
The dividing line, although not set out in dollars and 
cents, is clear and almost universally followed. Valuable 
compensation must generally be wages or salary in order to 
convert a gratuitous servant into a statutory employee. This 
is the same position adopted by this court in Olsen. The court 
stated at page 52 "An employee is hired and paid a salary or 
wage, works under the direction of the employer, and is subject 
to the employerf s control." 
Scott received no wages, nor did he receive valuable 
compensation. The promise of complementary theater passes, to 
which he was already entitled, through his father's employment, 
is not a valuable compensation. Scott was a gratuitous servant. 
POINT III 
PUBLIC POLICY INTENTIONALLY EXCLUDES 
VOLUNTEERS FROM WORKER'S ACT COVERAGE 
A. Worker's Act coverage is exclusive by its terms. 
The purpose of the legislature when it enacted the 
Industrial Act (Laws of Utah, 1917, Ch. 100 Sec. 72) was well 
understood. 
29 
[A] no-fault system was inaugurated to guarantee an 
employee some financial compensation for injuries incurred 
by him in the scope of his employment without burdening 
him with the uncertain and expensive task of his 
establishing negligence on the part of his employer. 
Hinds v. Herm Hughes and Sons, Inc. 577 P. 2d 561, 564 
(Utah 1978) (dissent). 
However, the Industrial Act was not born fully developed, 
but was changed and amended over time to better meet its goal 
of providing compensation to employees while avoiding 
litigation. 
The Worker's Act uses a number of different methods to 
reach this goal which include mandates to employers, see U.C.A. 
Section 35-1-46, penalties for noncompliance, see U.C.A. 
Section 35-1-60, and exclusionary definitions, see U.C.A. 
Sections 35-1-42 and 43. 
U.C.A. Section 35-1-43(1) sets out to precisely define 
what is meant by the term "employee" in the context of the 
Worker's Act. Section 35-1-43 reads in pertinent part: 
(a) each elective and appointive officer and any other 
person, in the service of the state, or of any county, 
city, town, or school district within the state, serving 
the state, or any county, city, town, or school district 
under any election or appointment, or under any contract 
of hire, express or implied, written or oral, including 
each officer and employee of the state institutions of 
learning; and 
(b) each person in the service of any employer, as 
defined in Section 35-1-42, who employs one or more 
workers or operatives regularly in the same business, or 
in or about the same establishment, under any contract of 
hire, express of implied, oral or written, including 
aliens and minors, whether legally or illegally working 
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for hire, but not including any person whose employment is 
casual and not in the usual course of the trade, business, 
or occupation of his employer. 
Every governmental official and worker is included under 
Section 43(l)(a). Section 43(1)(b) is equally clear in setting 
out the three requirements for private statutory employment; 
regular work in the usual course of business under a contract 
of hire. 
Although the definitions set out in Section 35-1-43(1) are 
precise and describe groups which can be accurately identified, 
the further question remains as to whether these definitions 
are exemplary or exclusionary in effect. If the definitions 
are exemplary, other workers who only meet the criteria in a 
general way may be eligible for Worker's Act coverage. 
Conversely, exclusionary definitions mark the outer boundaries 
of the covered group, and only workers who exactly fit within 
the parameters of the definition may receive the benefits of 
the Worker's Act. 
The definitions of Section 35-1-43(1) begin with the 
following language: 
As used in this chapter, "employee", "worker" or 
"workman", and "operative" mean 
"As used in this chapter" limits the scope of the 
definition to the Worker's Act. The words to be defined, 
"employee", etc, are the critical issue here. The words to be 
defined are then followed by the verb "mean". "Mean", then, is 
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the critical word, as it will either make the definition of 
"employee" exemplary or exclusionary with regard to its 
following modifiers. 
In 4 Sands, Sutherland on Statutory Construction Section 
47.04 at p. 133, it states: 
A definition which declares what a term means, on the 
other hand, exludes any meaning that is not stated. 
That "means" is exclusive in effect has been explicitly 
held in numerous jurisdictions throughout this nation. See, 
e.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 99 S. Ct. 675, 58 
L.Ed. 2d 596 (1978), wherein the Supreme Court noted the 
limiting characteristics of "means". 
"Means" is exclusive in effect and therefore only workers 
which meet the list of statutory requirements can be employees 
for purposes of the Worker's Act. 
This court has had opportunity in the past to comment on 
whether explicit exclusionary language should be upheld or 
ignored. In Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 
806 (Utah 1988), this court was asked to ignore explicit 
language in the Utah Dram Shop Act and allow an action to 
proceed which was expressly forbidden by that statute. The 
court held that: 
Where statutory language is plan and unambigous, this 
court will not look beyond to divine legislative in font. 
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763 P.2d at 809. 
The plain language of the Worker's Act limits coverage to 
employees who meet the statutory definition. Scott, and all 
the other gratuitous workers for SCERA, are excluded from the 
Worker's Act by this definition. 
B. The court and the legislature recognize the Worker's 
Act to be exclusive. 
In Rockefeller v. Industrial Commission, 58 Utah 124, 197 
P. 1038 (1921) , this court emphasized its understanding that 
the language of the then Industrial Act was exclusive in nature 
by carefully examining the facts in light of the statutory 
definition. That the court has retained the same understanding 
of the exclusive nature of the Worker's Act is evidenced by the 
analysis employed in recent cases such as Olsen. 
The legislature has relied upon its understanding that the 
definition of "employee" contained in the Worker's Act is 
exclusive in enacting statutes. As defined by U.C.A. Section 
35-1-43(1), the differences between a private sector employee, 
as discussed above in Points I and II, and a government 
employee under the Worker's Act is that elected officials and 
appointed officials are included, and Section 35-1-43(1)(a) 
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only requires all other government employees to work under a 
"contract of hire". There is no requirement that the 
government employee work either regularly or in the usual 
course of the business. As discussed above, a "contract of 
hire" consists of a contract of employment and wages. Edwards. 
In 1983, the legislature recognized that even this minimal 
requirement for government employee status, "contract of hire", 
excluded certain workers from Worker's Act coverage. Chapter 
20 of Title 67, originally the Volunteer State Workers Act and 
now the Volunteer Government Worker's Act (Volunteer Act) was 
enacted specifically to extend Worker's Act coverage to 
volunteers working for agencies. (U.C.A. Section 67-20-3(1)) 
U.C.A. Sections 67-20-2(3) and 67-20-4 define agency volunteers 
as: 
(3) (a) "Volunteer" means any person who donates 
service without pay or other compensation except 
expenses actually and reasonable incurred as approved 
by the supervising agency. 
(b) "Volunteer" does not include any person 
participating in human subjects research to the extent 
that the participation is governed by federal law or 
regulation inconsistent with this chapter, nor does it 
include community service workers. 
4. A volunteer may not donate any service to an agency 
unless the volunteer's services are approved by the 
chief executive of that agency or his authorized 
representative, and by the office of personnel having 
jurisdiction over that agency. 
Agency volunteers are unpaid, but work under the direction 
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and control of the agency. The legislature, however, 
considered partial failure of the "contract of hire" -- no 
wages -- to be sufficient to bar agency volunteers from 
Worker's Act coverage* This remedial statute was the result. 
In 1988, the legislature amended the Volunteer Act and 
extended Worker's Act coverage to two more groups, volunteer 
firefighters and community service workers. (U.C.A. Sections 
67-20-6 and 7). 
Volunteer firefighters, as defined by U.C.A. Section 
49-5-103(11), are: 
[A]ny individual that is not regularly employed as a 
firefighter, but who is on the rolls of a regularly 
constituted fire department. 
A community service worker is defined in U.C.A. Section 
67-20-2(2) as: 
[A]ny person who has been convicted of a criminal offense, 
any youth who has been adjudged delinquent, or any person 
or youth who has been diverted from the criminal or 
juvenile justice system and who performs a public service 
for an agency as a condition of his sentence, diversion, 
probation or parole. 
Volunteer firefighters are not paid wages but are 
regularly enrolled, thus operating under a contract of 
employment. Community service workers also are not paid wages, 
although they are working in lieu of a fine or to avoid 
confinement. Community service workers do agree, however, to 
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work under the direction of a government agency -- contract of 
employment. These two additional groups, which are not paid 
regular wages, do not work under "contracts of hire." The 
explicit extension of Worker's Act coverage to these volunteers 
confirms the legislature's understanding that the definition is 
exclusive. 
Both the court and the legislature understand the 
definition of employee in section 35-1-43(1) to be exclusive, 
the legislature by explicit extension of coverage by statute, 
the court through careful analysis of the limits of the 
exclusion and its enforcement. 
C. Extending Worker's Act coverage is contrary to public 
policy. 
Extension of Worker's Act coverage to every individual who 
regularly works in the course of an employer's business for 
little or no compensation could have a profound effect on 
charitable organizations in the state of Utah. 
Religious groups frequently rely upon unpaid volunteers 
for regular custodial service and grounds maintenance. 
Volunteers regularly carry out pastoral duties of visiting 
members of the congregation and caring for the sick. Some 
congregations rely upon unpaid ministers either because they 
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cannot afford one or have a policy against a paid ministry. 
Charitable institutions, such as the United Way, rely upon 
numerous volunteers to regularly perform essential tasks. The 
Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts of American train and certify 
leaders at troop, district and council level within the state 
who regularly perform tasks daily, weekly, and monthly. These 
organizations provide program guidelines, approve plans for 
activities and oversee events carried out by these volunteers. 
United Way volunteers drive the elderly and handicapped, 
perform fund raising and provide office help. 
Some religious organizations operate farms and canneries 
almost exclusively through the use of volunteers. The 
volunteers are directed and controlled by the organization's 
employees. All of this is common knowledge and subject to 
judicial notice under Utah Rule of Evidence 201(b)(1). 
The impact which extension of the Workerf s Act might have 
on these organizations could be very significant. Each 
organization would have to keep track of immense amounts of 
information on its volunteers in order to show which were 
regular and which were casual workers. Each organization would 
also have to determine which volunteers were employees and must 
be insured. 
The costs to such organizations could also be extremely 
burdensome. The imposition of this requirement might nlso 
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strain the Industrial Commission, 
Extending the Worker's Act to volunteers is a significant 
step. If such an extension is made, as a matter of policy such 
a step should be left up to the legislature. This court should 
not extend the Workerf s Act to cover Scott Gourdin and the many 
volunteers like him throughout the state providing valuable 
services without pay. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Scott Gourdin was helping a community service organiza-
tion, SCERA, without any promise of valuable compensation when 
he was injured on June 21, 1985. The trial court entered a 
directed verdict against Scott, finding that he was a statutory 
employee. The evidence demonstrates that Scott Gourdin was not 
a statutory employee when he was injured, because he neither 
regularly worked for SCERA, nor was he under a "contract of 
hire", -- because he had no promise of valuable compensation. 
The directed verdict was therefore improperly entered. 
Scott was a gratuitous servant, precisely because his work 
for SCERA was not based upon a "contract of hire." He did not 
receive valuable compensation. Gratuitous servants contribute 
significant support to charitable institutions in Utah. 
Extending Worker's Act coverage to this group is a decision 
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which ought to be left up the legislature. 
This court should recognize that Scott, and all other 
non-excepted gratuitous servants, are not statutory employees, 
and are not covered by the Worker's Act. This court should 
therefore vacate the directed verdict and remand to the 
district court with an instruction that Scott was a gratuitous 
servant at the time he was injured. 
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ADDENDUM A 
ADDENDUM A 
Utah Code Annotated (1991) 35-1-42(2) 
Employers enumerated and defined - Regularly employed -
Statutory employers. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), each person, 
including each public utility and each independent 
contractor, who regularly employs one or more workers or 
operatives in the same business, or in or about the same 
establishment, under any contract of hire, express or 
implied, oral or written is considered an employer under 
this title. As used in this subsection: 
(a) "Regularly" includes all employments in the usual 
course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation 
of the employer, whether continuous throughout the year or 
for only a portion of the year. 
(b) "Independent contractor" means any person engaged 
in the performance of any work for another who, while so 
engaged, is independent of the employer in all that 
pertains to the execution of the work, is not subject to 
the rule or control of the employer, is engaged only in 
the performance of a definite job or piece of work, and is 
subordinate to the employer only in effecting a result in 
accordance with the employer's design. 
U.C.A. Section 35-1-43(1) 
"Employee," "worker" or "workmen," and "operative" 
defined - Mining lessees and sublessee - Partners and sole 
proprietors - Corporate officers and directors - Real 
estate agents and brokers. 
(1) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker" or 
"workmen," and "operative" mean: 
(a) each elective and appointive officer and any 
other person, in the service of the state, or of any 
county, city, town, or school district within the state, 
serving the state, or any county, city, town, or school 
district under any election or appointment, or under any 
contract of hire, express or implied, written or oral, 
including each officer and employee of the state 
institutions of learning; and 
(b) each person in the service of any employer, as 
defined in Section 35-1-42, who employs one or more 
workers or operatives regularly in the same business, or 
in or about the same establishment, under any contract of 
hire, express or implied, oral or written, including any 
person whose employment is casual and not in the usual 
course of the trade, business, or occupation of his 
employer. 
C. U.C.A. Section 35-1-57 
Noncompliance - Penalty. 
Employers who shall fail to comply with the provisions of 
Section 35-1-46 shall not be entitled to the benefits of 
this title during the period of noncompliance, but shall 
be liable in a civil action to their employees for damages 
suffered by reason of personal injuries arising out of or 
in the course of employment caused by the wrongful act, 
neglect or default of the employer or any of the 
employer's officers, agents or employees, and also to the 
dependents or personal representatives of such employees 
where death results from such injuries. In any such 
action the defendant shall not avail himself of any of the 
following defenses: the defense of the fellow-servant 
rule, the defense of assumption of risk, or the defense of 
contributory negligence. Proof of the injury shall 
constitute prima facie evidence of negligence on the part 
of the employer and the burden shall be upon the employer 
to show freedom from negligence resulting in such injury. 
And such employers shall also be subject to the provisions 
of the two sections next succeeding [Sections 35-1-58, 35-
1-59]. In any civil action permitted under this section 
against the employer the employee shall be entitled to 
necessary costs and a reasonable attorney fees assessed 
against the employer. 
U.C.A. Section 35-1-60 
Exclusive remedy against employer, or officer agent of 
employee -- Occupational disease excepted. 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the 
provisions of this title for injuries sustained by an 
employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be the 
exclusive remedy against the employer and shall be the 
exclusive remedy against any officer, agent, or employee 
of the employer and the liabilities of the employer 
imposed by this act shall be in place of any and all other 
civil liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to 
such employee or to his spouse, widow, children, parents, 
dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal representatives, 
guardian, or any other person whomsoever, on account of 
any accident or injury or death, in any way contracted, 
sustained, aggravated or incurred by such employee in the 
course of or because of or arising out of his employment, 
and no action at law may be maintained against an employer 
based upon any accident, injury or death of an employee. 
Nothing in this section, however, shall prevent an 
employee (or his dependents) from filing a claim with the 
industrial commission of Utah for compensation in those 
cases within the provisions of the Utah 
Occupational Disease Disability Act, as amended. 
U.C.A. Section 35-l-75(1) (e) and (f), and (2) 
Average weekly wage -- Basis of computation. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this act, the 
average weekly wage of the injured employee at the time of 
the injury shall be taken as the basis upon which to 
compute the weekly compensation rate and shall be 
determined as follows: 
(e) If at the time of the injury the 
wages are fixed by the hour the average 
weekly wage shall be determined by 
multiplying the hourly rate by the number of 
hours the employee would have worked for the 
week if the accident had not intervened. In 
no case shall the hourly wage be multiplied 
by less than 20 for the purpose of 
determining the weekly wage. 
(f) If at the time of the injury the 
hourly wage has not been fixed or cannot be 
ascertained, the wage for the purpose of 
calculating compensation shall be the usual 
wage for similar services where those 
services are rendered by paid employees. 
(2) When the average weekly wage of the 
injured employee at the time of the injury is 
determined as in this section provided, it shall 
be taken as the basis upon which to compute the 
weekly compensation rate. After the weekly 
compensation has been computed, it shall be 
rounded to the nearest dollar. 
F. U.C.A. Section 49-5-103(11) 
"Volunteer firefighter" means any individual 
that is not regularly employed as a firefighter, but 
who is on the rolls of a regularly constituted fire 
department. An individual that volunteers assistance 
but is not a regularly enrolled firefighter is not a 
volunteer firefighter. Service as a volunteer 
firelighter is not creditable towards qualifying for a 
service retirement allowance. 
U.C.A. Section 67-20-1 
This chapter is known as the "Volunteer Government 
Workers Act." 
U.C.A. Section 67-20-2 as used in this chapter: 
(1) "Agency" means: 
(a) any department, institution, office, 
college, university, authority, division, board, 
bureau, commission, council, or other agency of 
the state; 
(b) any county, city, town, school 
district, or special improvement or taxing 
district; 
(c) any Olympic Winter Games organizing 
committee, as approved by the Utah Sports 
Authority; or 
(d) any other political subdivion. 
(2) "Community service worker" means any person 
who has been convicted of a criminal offense, any youth 
who has been adjudged delinquent, or any person or 
youth who has been diverted from the criminal or 
juvenile justice system and who performs a public 
service for an agency as a condition of his sentence, 
diversion, probation, or parole. 
(3) (a) "Volunteer" means any person who 
donates service without pay or other compensation 
except expenses actually and reasonable incurred 
as approved by the supervising agency. 
(b) "Volunteer" does not include any person 
participating in human subjects research to the 
extent that the participation is governed by 
federal law or regulation inconsistent with this 
chapter, nor does it include community service 
workers. 
I. U.C.A. Section 67-20-3 
A volunteer is considered a government employee for 
purposes of: 
(1) receiving workersf compensation medical 
benefits, which shall be the exclusive remedy for all 
injuries and occupational diseases as provided under 
Chapters 1 and 2, Title 35; 
(2) the operation of motor vehicles or equipment 
if the volunteer is property licensed and authorized to 
do so; and 
(3) liability protection and indemnification 
normally afforded paid government employees. 
J. U.C.A. Section 67-20-4 
A volunteer may not donate any service to an agency 
unless the volunteer's services are approved by the 
chief executive of that agency or his authorized 
representative, and by the office of personnel having 
jurisdiction over that agency. 
K. U.C.A. Section 67-20-6 
A community service worker is considered a government 
employee for purposes of receiving workers compensation 
benefits, which shall be the exclusive remedy for all 
injuries and occupational diseases as provided under 
Chapters 1 and 2, Title 35. 
U.C.A. Section 67-20-7 
In addition to the purposes set out in Subsections 
67-20-3(2) and (3), a volunteer firefighter, as defined 
in Subsection 49-5-103(12), is considered an agency 
employee for the purpose of receiving worker's 
compensation benefits under Chapters 1 and 2, Title 
35. These benefits are the exclusive remedy for all 
injuries and occupational diseases resulting from his 
services as a volunteer firefighter. Compensation 
shall be computed as indicated in Section 49-5-802. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 201(b)(1) 
A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to 
reasonable dispute in that it is (1) generally known within 
the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court. 
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Yes. 
Were you formerly married to Scott's mother, Pat 
Yes, I was. 
Now known as Pat Gourdin Hall? 
Yes. 
Would you tell me just very briefly about your 
educational background? 
A 
Q 
A 
went back 
teach 
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Tell the jury, I guess. 
I graduated from BYU, in foreign language, and later 
and got a masters in curriculum design. I currently 
Spanish and social studies at Lake Ridge Junior High 
School. 
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A 
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years 
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Do you have part-time employment? 
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Where is that? 
With the Scera Theater. 
How long have you had part-time employment with the 
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old 
Since about the age of 13 or 14. I'm currently 50 
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So however long that is. 
Yes. 
Lone time. 
1 A Yes. 
2 Q Were you formerly married to Scott's mother, Pat 
3 Gourdin? 
4 A Yes, I was. 
5 Q Now known as Pat Gourdin Hall? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q Would you tell me just very briefly about your 
8 educational background? 
9 A I graduated — 
10 Q Tell the jury, I guess. 
11 A I graduated from BYU, in foreign language, and later 
12 went back and got a masters in curriculum design. I currently 
13 teach Spanish and social studies at Lake Ridge Junior High 
14 School. 
15 Q Do you have part - t ime employment? 
16 A Yes, I do. 
17 Q Where is that? 
18 A With the Scera Theater. 
19 Q How long have you had part-time employment with the 
20 Scera Theater? 
21 A Since about the age of 13 or 14. I'm currently 50 
22 years old. 
23 Q So however long that is. 
24 A Yes. 
1 work one day or more a week for two or three, up to four 
2 hours, and were not paid for their services. 
3 Q Why? 
4 A Because it was, Scera is a community theater, and 
5 many people that work there do so on a volunteer basis. And 
6 the young people would give their time as service to the com-
7 munity. 
8 Q Were there volunteer workers there on June 21, 1985 
9 working on the grounds or cutting the lawn around Scera? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q And who were they? 
12 A Jason Gourdin and Scott Gourdin were there working. 
13 Q Now, who was operating power lawnmowers on that day?| 
14 A Both Jason and Scott. 
15 Q Would you describe for the jury, just in very gen-
16 eral terms, what type of mowers they were? 
17 A We had two mowers. One was a riding tr act or-mower, 
18 was a double-rotor blade underneath. And the other was a 
19 walk-behind rotor blade mower. 
20 Q Those are, so both mowers, the type that have a 
21 blade that cuts parallel to the ground? 
22 A Yes. 
23 Q Okay. Now I direct your attention to the morning 
24 of that day, and ask you to tell me what you observed up and 
25 I through and just before the time that Scott was injured; what 
1 work one day or more a week for two or three, up to four 
2 hours, and were not paid for their services. 
3 Q Why? 
4 A Because it was, Scera is a community theater, and 
5 many people that work there do so on a volunteer basis. And 
6 the young people would give their time as service to the com-
7 munity. 
8 Q Were there volunteer workers there on June 21, 1985 
9 working on the grounds or cutting the lawn around Scera? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q And who were they? 
12 A Jason Gourdin and Scott Gourdin were there working. 
13 Q Now, who was operating power lawnmowers on that day?| 
14 A Both Jason and Scott. 
15 Q Would you describe for the jury, just in very gen-
16 eral terms, what type of mowers they were? 
17 A We had two mowers. One was a riding tractor-mower, 
18 was a double-rotor blade underneath. And the other was a 
19 walk-behind rotor blade mower. 
20 Q Those are, so both mowers, the type that have a 
21 blade that cuts parallel to the ground? 
22 A Yes. 
23 Q Okay. Now I direct your attention to the morning 
24 of that day, and ask you to tell me what you observed up and 
25 I f-ViT»niio»Vi And iust before the time that Scott was injured; what 
1 it after school. Wefd go mow it on Saturday mornings. But 
2 when school was out, generally mowed the law during the week. 
3 Q All right. Tell me what happened after you edged 
4 around the grass at Scera on June 21, 1985? 
5 A You mean with regards to the accident? 
6 Q Yes. 
7 A Well, Scotty was mowing one of the lawns, has a row, 
8 has a row of flowers, they are now roses, and a hedge. And 
9 in mowing the lawn, the mower slipped down in and got caught 
10 in the one hedge, and was unable to get it out. 
11 Q Now Ifm showing you what has been marked as Plain-
12 tiff fs Exhibit No. 2. And Ifm looking at Photograph No. 1. 
13 Can you see that? (indicating) 
14 A Yes, 1 can. 
15 Q Would that have been in the area where Ifm pointing? 
16 A Yes, right up there in that corner. 
17 Q Okay, continue as you would, please. 
18 A Like I say, I had gone into the building prior, just 
19 prior to the accident, someone came in, actually it was a 
20 delivery man, and said Scott had been hurt. Of course I 
21 immediately went to see what the problem was, and wrapped his 
22 hands and took off and went to the hospital. 
23 Q Well, when you last saw him before he was injured 
24 he was doing, what? 
rt
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4 around the grass at Scera on June 21, 1985? 
5 A You mean with regards to the accident? 
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7 A Well, Scotty was mowing one of the lawns, has a row, 
8 has a row of flowers, they are now roses, and a hedge. And 
9 in mowing the lawn, the mower slipped down in and got caught 
10 in the one hedge, and was unable to get it out. 
11 Q Now I'm showing you what has been marked as Plain-
12 tiff fs Exhibit No. 2. And Ifm looking at Photograph No. 1. 
13 Can you see that? (indicating) 
14 A Yes, I can. 
15 Q Would that have been in the area where I'm pointing? 
16 A Yes, right up there in that corner. 
17 Q Okay, continue as you would, please. 
18 A Like I say, I had gone into the building prior, just 
19 prior to the accident, someone came in, actually it was a 
20 delivery man, and said Scott had been hurt. Of course I 
21 immediately went to see what the problem was, and wrapped his 
22 hands and took off and went to the hospital. 
23 Q Well, when you last saw him before he was injured 
24 he was doing, what? 
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1 MR. GLAUSER: Page 27, line 5, your Honor\ 
2 Q (By Mr. Glauser) Question: "Were Scotty and Jason 
3 two of your regular helpers in cutting the grass?" 
4 A "No." 
5 Q "Did they help you cut the grass on a weekly basis?1 
6 A "They helped cut the grass, but the older boys 
7 would mow the lawns most of the time. If we were getting 
8 behind or something, then Scott and Jason would, wanted to 
9 help, and I would let them." 
10 Q "How often would you say that Scotty mowed the 
11 grass before his accident? Would it be cone a month?" 
12 A "He probably cut the grass two or three times, 
13 maybe four times." 
14 Q Does that refresh your recollection, Mr. Gourdin? 
15 A Um-hum. (yes) 
16 Q Would you agree with this testimony, sworn testimony 
17 you gave earlier? 
18 A Yes, I would. 
19 Q Okay. Were you the individual that was controlling 
20 Scott's, you told him what to do? 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q When he was at Scera. Now, Mr. Gourdin, also wasn't^ 
23 a requirement that before someone could become a staff member 
24 at Scera, they went through an interview process? 
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6 A "They helped cut the grass, but the older boys 
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10 Q "How often would you say that Scotty mowed the 
11 grass before his accident? Would it be cone a month?" 
12 A "He probably cut the grass two or three times, 
13 maybe four times." 
14 Q Does that refresh your recollection, Mr. Gourdin? 
15 A Um-hum. (yes) 
16 Q Would you agree with this testimony, sworn testimony) 
17 you gave earlier? 
18 A Yes, I would. 
19 Q Okay. Were you the individual that was controlling 
20 Scott's, you told him what to do? 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q When he was at Scera. Now, Mr. Gourdin, also wasn't^ 
23 a requirement that before someone could become a staff member 
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1 Q Uh-huh. (yes) 
2 A Yes, he was. 
3 Q .Did he mow at your house within a year or two after 
4 the accident? 
5 A Yes. Probably, I mean, Ifm assuming that. He did 
6 mow the lawn, I know that. Later on he got so he would do it.j 
7 Q And that was within a year or two? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q That would have been when he was age ten or approxi-| 
10 mately around there? 
11 A About then, yes. 
12 MR. GLAUSER: I don't think I have any 
13 more questions, your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Any redirect, Mr. Young? 
15 MR. YOUNG: Very brief. 
16 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
17 BY MR. YOUNG: 
18 Q All right. A couple of points. In 1985, in June, 
19 who had the authority to hire and use volunteer workers at 
20 Scera? 
21 A I did. 
22 Q You did have that authority? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q And you testified that you were controlling Scott, 
1 Q Uh-huh. (yes) 
2 A Yes, he was. 
3 Q .Did he mow at your house within a year or two after 
4 the accident? 
5 A Yes. Probably, I mean, Ifm assuming that. He did 
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8 A Yes. 
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12 MR. GLAUSER: I don't think I have any 
13 more questions, your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Any redirect, Mr. Young? 
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Q You most certainly are. "Now, do the Scera managers 
also have the authority to hire volunteers to help with their 
work?" 
A "They make the final decision on the people that 
work in their departments, yes." 
Q Thank you. 
MR. YOUNG: That's all I have. 
THE COURT: Do you have any cross of this 
witness at this time, Mr. Glauser? 
MR. GLAUSER: I think so, your Honor. 
MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, we move to pub-
lish the deposition of Ron Nielsen. 1 think that's been 
done. 
THE COURT: I think all of these deposi-
tions have been ordered to be published, and that's reaffirm-
ed. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. GLAUSER: 
Q Mr. Nielsen, you were asked some questions about 
Scera. Will you explain to the jury a little bit, first 
tell them what "Scera" stands for? 
A Scera is Sharon's Cultural, Educational & Recre-
ational Association. Been in existence now almost 60 years. 
It's primary purpose is to provide cultural, educational and 
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1 Q You most certainly are. "Now, do the Scera manager^ 
2 also have the authority to hire volunteers to help with their 
3 work?" 
4 A "They make the final decision on the people that 
5 work in their departments, yes." 
6 Q Thank you. 
7 MR. YOUNG: That's all I have. 
8 THE COURT: Do you have any cross of this 
9 witness at this time, Mr. Glauser? 
10 MR. GLAUSER: I think so, your Honor. 
11 MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, we move to pub-
12 lish the deposition of Ron Nielsen. I think that's been 
13 done. 
14 THE COURT: I think all of these deposi-
15 tions have been ordered to be published, and thatfs reaffirm-
16 ed. 
17 CROSS EXAMINATION 
18 BY MR. GLAUSER: 
19 Q Mr. Nielsen, you were asked some questions about 
20 Scera. Will you explain to the jury a little bit, first 
21 tell them what "Scera" stands for? 
22 A Scera is Sharon's Cultural, Educational & Recre-
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1 Q Scera apparently also had some volunteer workers? 
2 A That is correct. 
3 Q How old were the volunteer workers at Scera in '85? 
4 a Volunteer workers were, again, normally in the 
5 11-to-12 year age. There may be occasions when they were 
6 younger, but not very many. 
7 Q How would Scera recruit volunteer workers in f85? 
8 A There were a number of ways it was done. Communi-
9 cation with neighbors, seminaries, at the junior high school 
10 and the high school, as well as through the public school 
11 system, indicating there were opportunities for community 
12 service available for those young people who wanted to enhanc4 
13 their skills, their training skills, and in return receive 
14 some movie privileges. And in this matter we attempted to 
15 recruit or make it available to young people. 
16 Q How would someone become a volunteer at Scera? 
17 A Well, after 1982 there were some considerable pro-
18 cedures, very specific procedures placed in the process. The 
19 most, one of the most important procedures is that an appli-
20 cation needs to be filled out. It was not. 
21 Q Was that an optional thing? 
22 A That was not an optional thing. 
23 Q Let me show you what's been marked as Defendant's 
24 Exhibit 11. Would you tell the jury what that is, please? 
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16 Q How would someone become a volunteer at Scera? 
17 A Well, after 1982 there were some considerable pro-
18 cedures, very specific procedures placed in the process. The 
19 most, one of the most important procedures is that an appli-
20 cation needs to be filled out. It was not. 
21 Q Was that an optional thing? 
22 A That was not an optional thing. 
23 Q Let me show you what's been marked as Defendantfs 
24 Exhibit 11. Would you tell the jury what that is, please? 
*>* I A This is an aDDlication form that was in effect at 
1 (off the record at the bench, inaudible) 
2 THE COURT: All right, you may proceed, 
3 Mr. Glauser. 
4 1 MR. GLAUSER: Thank you, your Honor. 
5 Q (Mr. Glauser) Mr. Nielsen, did you have an occasioi} 
6 to check to see if an application was ever on file for Scott 
7 Gourdin? 
8 A Yes, I did. 
9 Q What did you find? 
10 A I found there was no application. 
11 Q You were asked on direct examination to read por-
12 tions of your deposition. 
13 A That is correct. 
14 Q And I think you wanted to, specifically, you read 
15 your statement where you said the managers have final deci-
16 sion who works in their departments? 
17 A Correct. 
18 Q What did you mean when you said that? 
19 A I think itfs very important as a management style 
20 to have managers do the final selection of the people they 
21 work with. Otherwise, managers canft be effective. A manageij 
22 must have a kind of relationship with his staff wherein the 
23 staff feels obligated to follow the requests and the super-
24 vision of the managers. In the process that we implemented 
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5 Q (Mr. Glauser) Mr. Nielsen, did you have an occasioi} 
6 to check to see if an application was ever on file for Scott 
7 Gourdin? 
8 A Yes, I did. 
9 Q What did you find? 
10 A I found there was no application. 
11 Q You were asked on direct examination to read por-
12 tions of your deposition. 
13 A That is correct. 
14 Q And I think you wanted to, specifically, you read 
15 your statement where you said the managers have final deci-
16 sion who works in their departments? 
17 A Correct. 
18 Q What did you mean when you said that? 
19 A I think it's very important as a management style 
20 to have managers do the final selection of the people they 
21 work with. Otherwise, managers can't be effective. A manageij 
22 must have a kind of relationship with his staff wherein the 
23 staff feels obligated to follow the requests and the super-
24 vision of the managers. In the process that we implemented 
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1 Q Why not? 
2 A Scott Gourdin was not a staff member, because there 
3 was never.an application, there was never an interview, there 
4 was never a discussion, there was never a work schedule. 
5 MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, I'm going to 
6 object to this on the basis it's going beyond the scope of th^ 
7 examination. He's referring to staff members. They are, 
8 right, different. And I quote. His statement was that he 
9 makes the final decision on the people that they hire in the 
10 department, yes. And the question was, have authority to 
11 hire volunteers. He's talking about staff. 
12 MR. GLAUSER: I can clear that up real 
13 fast, your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: All right, you may. 
15 Q (By Mr. Glauser) Mr. Nielsen, volunteers are staff 
16 members? 
17 A Absolutely. 
18 Q Have they always been considered staff members? 
19 A Yes, they have. 
20 Q I'm sorry, we were interrupted. 
21 A Whatever I said about staff members would also 
22 apply to volunteers. 
23 Q Will you explain to the jury why Scott Gourdin was 
24 not a staff member in 1985? Would that include just, let's 
"^ ' --~~ ~*4- Q w A l t m f o o r in 1Q85? 
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4 was never a discussion, there was never a work schedule. 
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6 object to this on the basit It's going beyond the scope of th4 
7 examination. Hefs referring to staff members. They are, 
8 right, different. And I quote. His statement was that he 
9 makes the final decision on the people that they hire in the 
10 department, yes. And the question was, have authority to 
11 hire volunteers. He's talking about staff. 
12 MR. GLAUSER: I can clear that up real 
13 fast, your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: All right, you may. 
15 Q (By Mr. Glauser) Mr. Nielsen, volunteers are staff 
16 members? 
17 A Absolutely. 
18 Q Have they always been considered staff members? 
19 A Yes, they have. 
20 Q I'm sorry, we were interrupted. 
21 A Whatever I said about staff members would also 
22 apply to volunteers. 
23 Q Will you explain to the jury why Scott Gourdin was 
24 not a staff member in 1985? Would that include just, let's 
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Q And you've never allowed that to lapse while you 
have been there? 
A Not to my knowledge. 
MR. GLAUSER: I don't have any more 
questions, your Honor. 
BY MR. 
Q 
THE COURT: Any cross, Mr. Young? 
MR. YOUNG: Yes. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
YOUNG: 
Mr. Nielsen, in your file, you signed an application 
for Scott Gourdin, did you not? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
cation 
I believe that was found by the secretary. 
You didn't submit it, did you? 
I beg your pardon? 
You did not submit it, did you? 
Submit it — 
You didn't submit the — 
No. 
-- for the benefits? 
No. 
MR. YOUNG: That's all I have. 
THE COURT: Let me understand. An appli-
for compensation, is that what we are talking about? 
MR. YOUNG: Yes, sir. 
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1 Q And you've never allowed that to lapse while you 
2 have been there? 
3 A •Not to my knowledge. 
4 MR. GLAUSER: I don't have any more 
5 questions, your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: Any cross, Mr. Young? 
7 MR. YOUNG: Yes. 
8 CROSS EXAMINATION 
9 BY MR. YOUNG: 
10 Q Mr. Nielsen, in your file, you signed an application 
11 for Scott Gourdin, did you not? 
12 A I believe that was found by the secretary. 
13 Q You didn't submit it, did you? 
14 A I beg your pardon? 
15 Q You did not submit it, did you? 
16 A Submit it --
17 Q You didn't submit the — 
18 A No. 
19 Q -- for the benefits? 
20 A No. 
21 MR. YOUNG: That's all I have. 
22 THE COURT: Let me understand. An appli-
23 cation tor compensation, is that what we are talking about? 
24 MR. YOUNG: Yes, sir. 
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Q (By Mr. Glauser) You may want to point to the 
judge what sections that you think would be helpful. 
A .Excuse me. Judge, there are two sections. In 
brackets, and the one that you were looking at in brackets. 
THE COURT: Do you have any questions of 
the witness? 
MR. YOUNG: No, sir. 
MR. GLAUSER: Your Honor, Ifm not quite 
through with Mr. Nielsen. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Q (By Mr. Glauser) Mr. Nielsen, explain to the Court 
what the benefits were for volunteers in 1985. 
A The benefits included free passes to the Scera 
Theater, for themselves and their immediate family. And of 
course the value of that was directly related to the size of 
the family. But because the volunteer worked there, he had 
the privilege of allowing the immediate family; and a persona]} 
friend, should he come to the, to the movie alone, he could 
bring a personal friend. It provided free passes to other 
movie theaters in Provo and Orem, had a cooperative relation-
ship with the other movie theaters, and going through the 
proper procedure, make the necessary calls ahead of time, 
and making the arrangement with the other theater, they could 
come to, they could take a friend and go to one of the other 
movies theaters, because of this coooerative relationship 
1 Q (By Mr. Glauser) You may want to point to the 
2 judge what sections that you think would be helpful. 
3 A .Excuse me. Judge, there are two sections. In 
4 brackets, and the one that you were looking at in brackets. 
5 THE COURT: Do you have any questions of 
6 the witness? 
7 MR. YOUNG: No, sir. 
8 I MR. GLAUSER: Your Honor, Ifm not quite 
9 through with Mr. Nielsen. 
10 THE COURT: All right. 
11 Q (By Mr. Glauser) Mr. Nielsen, explain to the Court 
12 what the benefits were for volunteers in 1985. 
13 A The benefits included free passes to the Scera 
14 Theater, for themselves and their immediate family. And of 
15 course the value of that was directly related to the size of 
16 the family. But because the volunteer worked there, he had 
17 the privilege of allowing the immediate family; and a persona]} 
18 friend, should he come to the, to the movie alone, he could 
19 bring a personal friend. It provided free passes to other 
20 movie theaters in Provo and Orem, had a cooperative relation-
21 ship with the other movie theaters, and going through the 
22 proper procedure, make the necessary calls ahead of time, 
23 and making the arrangement with the other theater, they could 
24 come to, they could take a friend and go to one of the other 
25 I movies theaters, because of this cooDerative relationshiD. 
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DIRECT EXAMINATION 
YOUNG: 
Scott, let me direct your attention to the fall 
i and spring of 1985. Are you oriented? 
What? 
Try to remember back in the fall of 1984 and the 
of 1985. 
(nodding affirmation) 
Okay? 
Okay. 
When you were mowing lawns over at Scera. 
(nodding affirmation) 
Remember? 
I believe. 
Did you ever get any tickets to Scera? 
No. 
Did you get any tickets to any place else? 
No. 
Did you ever go to a movie at Scera? 
Yes. 
Did you ever go to swimming at Scera? 
Yes. 
How would you get in? 
My dad. 
LTi-iot- Hn von mPAn bv vour dad? 
1 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
2 BY MR. YOUNG: 
3 Q Scott, let me direct your attention to the fall 
4 of 1984 and spring of 1985. Are you oriented? 
5 A What? 
6 Q Try to remember back in the fall of 1984 and the 
7 spring of 1985. 
8 A (nodding affirmation) 
9 Q Okay? 
10 A Okay. 
11 Q When you were mowing lawns over at Scera. 
12 A (nodding affirmation) 
13 Q Remember? 
14 A I believe. 
15 Q Did you ever get any tickets to Scera? 
16 A No. 
17 Q Did you get any tickets to any place else? 
18 A No. 
19 Q Did you ever go to a movie at Scera? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q Did you ever go to swimming at Scera? 
22 A Yes. 
23 Q How would you get in? 
24 A My dad. 
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for his employment or for his, whatever he did to go to 
movies, either at Scera or any place else? 
MR. GLAUSER: Let me voice an objection 
to the form of the question,your Honor. It's obviously lead-
ing. 
THE COURT: He may answer. 
A No, Scott didn't receive tickets or swimming passes 
for what he did at Scera, he received that because that was 
part of my status there. 
MR. YOUNG: Thank you. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. GLAUSER: 
Q Mr. Gourdin, let me show yoxrwhat's been marked as 
Defendant's Exhibit 20. Have you seen that document before 
today? 
A Scera And You, yes, I have, um-hum. 
Q And that document was in effect back in 1983, I 
believe. 
A I'm not sure of the date, but we use this document, 
yes. 
Q You even had some input on that document? 
A Yes. 
Q And that document contains, does it not, the bene-
fits that volunteers are entitled to receive. Correct? 
A Yes. 
1 for his employment or for his, whatever he did to go to 
2 movies, either at Scera or any place else? 
3 MR. GLAUSER: Let me voice an objection 
4 to the form of the question,your Honor. Itfs obviously lead-
5 ing. 
6 THE COURT: He may answer. 
7 A No, Scott didn't receive tickets or swimming passes 
8 for what he did at Scera, he received that because that was 
9 part of my status there. 
10 MR. YOUNG: Thank you. 
11 CROSS EXAMINATION 
12 BY MR. GLAUSER: 
13 Q Mr. Gourdin, let me show yourwhat's been marked as 
14 Defendant's Exhibit 20. Have you seen that document before 
15 today? 
16 A Scera And You, yes, I have, um-hum. 
17 Q And that document was in effect back in 1983, I 
18 believe. 
19 A I'm not sure of the date, but we use this document, 
20 yes, 
21 Q You even had some input on that document? 
22 A Yes. 
23 Q And that document contains, does it not, the bene-
24 fits that volunteers are entitled to receive. Correct? 
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1 THE COURT: Well, a motion has been made 
2 for a directed verdict on the basis that under the facts pre-
3 sented, that Scott GourddLn was an employee of Scera, whether 
4 you characterize them as volunteers or otherwise or as an 
5 employee, and that as such the remedies through which the 
6 plaintiff is entitled are limited by the Workmens Compensatioxj 
7 Statute. 
8 The question of whether or not an employee arrange-
9 ment exists depends on several circumstances. And the allega-] 
10 tion is and the proof demonstrates that Scott Gourdin was 
11 himself an employee of the, of Scera; that he did on behalf 
12 of Scera exercise the right of control over Scott --
13 MR. YOUNG: Excuse me. You earlier said 
14 Scott. 
15 THE COURT: Paul. I'm sorry. That Paul 
16 himself was a manager of the grounds that on behalf of, pur-
17 ported to exercise control over the time, place and circum-
18 stances of the work or services that were performed by Scott; 
19 that Paul purported to exercise the right to hire and fire 
20 employees or volunteers; that equipment was furnished by 
21 Scera and was supervised and the use thereof determined by 
22 Paul Gourdin. 
23 And the evidence is without dispute that there was 
24 some remuneration or compensation given to Scott as a conse-
^e UA e roiflfinnqhii) with Scera. Whether or not he 
1 THE COURT: Well, a motion has been made 
2 for a directed verdict on the basis that under the facts pre-
3 sented, that Scott Gourdin was an employee of Scera, whether 
4 you characterize them as volunteers or otherwise or as an 
5 employee, and that as such the remedies through which the 
6 plaintiff is entitled are limited by the Workmens Compensation 
7 Statute. 
8 The question of whether or not an employee arrange-
9 ment exists depends on several cirexamstances. And the allega-) 
10 tion is and the proof demonstrates that Scott Gourdin was 
11 himself an employee of the, of Scera; that he did on behalf 
12 of Scera exercise the right of control over Scott --
13 MR. YOUNG: Excuse me. You earlier said 
14 Scott. 
15 THE COURT: Paul. Ifm sorry. That Paul 
16 himself was a manager of the grounds that on behalf of, pur-
17 ported to exercise control over the time, place and circum-
18 stances of the work or services that were performed by Scott; 
19 that Paul purported to exercise the right to hire and fire 
20 employees or volunteers; that equipment was furnished by 
21 Scera and was supervised and the use thereof determined by 
22 Paul Gourdin. 
23 And the evidence is without dispute that there was 
24 some remuneration or compensation given to Scott as a conse-
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1 Lagoon with respect to the question of whether or not employ-
2 ment contrary to law would relieve a plaintiff of the conse-
3 quences of the exclusive provisions under the Workmens Com-
4 pensation Act. And the Court therein stated: "Plaintiff 
5 asserts that Shauna was illegally engaged in hazardous employ-] 
6 ments in violation of Section 34-23-2 and that she was there-
7 fore entitled to void her employment contract and sue the 
8 employer in court.11 Section 34-23-2 prohibits employment 
9 of persons under 18 years of age in any hazardous occupation. 
10 While the issue of whether Shauna was engaged in hazardous 
11 employment in violation of that section at the time of her 
12 accident is a question*of fact, a determination that she was 
13 so engaged would not assist her. Plaintiff relies on two 
14 cases where the court required, under Section 35-1-43, as 
15 then worded, "a showing that a minor was the lawfully employ-
16 ed will have become or limitations were places on the minor's 
17 rights or remedies in the law;11 then cites various cases. 
18 "If Section 35-1043 had not been amended subsequent 
19 to those cases, both Ortega and Henry would control here and 
20 Shauna could maintain this tort action. However, the legis-
21 lature amended that Section in 1945 to define employees, as 
22 among other things, minors, whether legally or illegally 
23 employed, legally working for hire. Thus, despite illegal 
24 employment, a minor is covered by the Workmens Compensation 
25 Act." 
1 Lagoon with respect to the question of whether or not employ-
2 ment contrary to law would relieve a plaintiff of the conse-
3 quences of the exclusive provisions under the Workmens Com-
4 pensation Act. And the Court therein stated: "Plaintiff 
5 asserts that Shauna was-illegally engaged in hazardous employ-
6 ments in violation of Section 34-23-2 and that she was there-
7 fore entitled to void her employment contract and sue the 
8 employer in court.11 Section 34-23-2 prohibits employment 
9 of persons under 18 years of age in any hazardous occupation. 
10 While the issue of whether Shauna was engaged in hazardous 
11 employment in violation of that section at the time of her 
12 accident is a question "of fact, a determination that she was 
13 so engaged would not assist her. Plaintiff relies on two 
14 cases where the court required, under Section 35-1-43, as 
15 then worded, "a showing that a minor was the lawfully employ-
16 ed will have become or limitations were places on the minor's 
17 rights or remedies in the law;11 then cites various cases. 
18 "If Section 35-1043 had not been amended subsequent 
19 to those cases, both Ortega and Henry would control here and 
20 Shauna could maintain this tort action. However, the legis-
21 lature amended that Section in 1945 to define employees, as 
22 among other things, minors, whether legally or illegally 
23 employed, legally working for hire. Thus, despite illegal 
24 employment, a minor is covered by the Workmens Compensation I 
25 Act." 
it, worried about it, and realize that the consequences of 
court taking it away from the jury is a serious thing. But 
I do believe that under the circumstances and the proof that 
is before this court, that the Court has no alternative. 
So the Court is going to grant the motion for a 
directed verdict, on the basis that the plaintiff is pre-
cluded under the Workmens Compensation Act; that he would 
recover, that his exclusive remedy is as provided in Section 
35-1-64; and that the Scera has no liability beyond providing 
Workmens Compensation benefits for this young man. 
So that will be the Order of the Court. 
You may bring the jury back in, and the Court will 
indicate the fact that it has entered a directed verdict in 
this matter. 
(WHEREUPON, the Jury returned into the courtroom, 
at 1:50 o'clock p.m.) 
THE COURT: The record should now show 
that the jury has returned to the box and is presently there-
in. 
Anything further at this time, counsel? 
MR. YOUNG: No, sir. 
MR. GLAUSER: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Ladies and Gentlemen of the 
Jury, the Court has been involved with counsel in considering 
IACPI matters and le^al arguments and motions. And a conse-
1 it, worried about it, and realize that the consequences of 
2 court taking it away from the jury is a serious thing. But 
3 I do believe that under the circumstances and the proof that 
4 is before this court, that the Court has no alternative. 
5 So the Court is going to grant the motion for a 
6 directed verdict, on the basis that the plaintiff is pre-
7 eluded under the Workmens Compensation Act; that he would 
8 recover, that his exclusive remedy is as provided in Section 
9 35-1-64; and that the Scera has no liability beyond providing 
10 Workmens Compensation benefits for this young man. 
11 So that will be the Order of the Court. 
12 You may bring the jury back in, and the Court will 
13 indicate the fact that it has entered a directed verdict in 
14 this matter. 
15 (WHEREUPON, the Jury returned into the courtroom, 
16 at 1:50 o'clock p.m.) 
17 THE COURT: The record should now show 
18 that the jury has returned to the box and is presently there-
19 in. 
20 Anything further at this time, counsel? 
21 MR. YOUNG: No, sir. 
22 MR. GLAUSER: No, your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: Ladies and Gentlemen of the 
24 Jury, the Court has been involved with counsel in considering 
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8-301 CONTRACT OF HIRE § 47.10 
§ 47. NECESSITY FOR "CONTRACT OF HIRE" 
§ 47.00 The compensation concept of "employee" is narrower 
than the common-law concept of "servant" in one important respect: 
Most acts require that the service be performed under a contract 
of hire, express or implied. Among the more important consequences 
of this requirement are the following: 
(a) In some jurisdictions, one spouse cannot be an employee of 
the other for compensation purposes, on a strict construction of the 
disability of one to make personal service contracts with the other; 
in other jurisdictions, courts have recognized the realities of modern 
business and marital relations, and have awarded compensation in 
such circumstances. 
(b) Persons who perform services and receive some kind of 
payment, but not under the usual contract between persons equally 
free to bargain and contract, such as prisoners and relief workers, 
have in the majority of cases been denied compensation. 
(c) Gratuitous servants are not employees, since the element of 
"hire" is lacking; but payment may be found in anything of value, 
such as board and lodging, and an agreement to pay is usually 
implied when the parties have omitted to make an express agree-
ment on payment. 
(d) Persons employed under illegal contracts of hire are usually 
denied compensation if the illegality results from the obligation of 
performing punishable acts, but not if it arises merely from a 
prohibition against making the contract, as in the case of minority. 
(e) A false statement in an employment application does not of 
itself make the employment contract invalid. Benefits are barred 
only if: (1) the employee knowingly and wilfully made a false 
representation as to his physical condition; (2) the employer relied 
on the representation and the reliance was a substantial factor in 
the hiring; and (3) t!iere was a causal relation between the false 
representation and the injury. 
§ 47.10 Reason for "contract" and "hire" requirements 
Up to this point, the discussion of status has shown that the 
compensation "employee" concept has expanded beyond the com-
mon-law "servant" concept in its actual application. There is, 
(Matthew Bender Sc C o . lnc ) (Rel 63-6/91 Pub 340) 
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however, one respect in which the compensation concept is nar-
rower than that of the common laws; most acts59-2 insist upon the 
existence of a ^contract of hire, express or implied," as an 
essential feature of the employment relation.60 At common law, 
59.2 The definitions in a particular statute must always be consulted on this 
point, since some of them also recognize persons in service under "appointment" 
or "apprenticeship." The rules discussed in this section, which assume a 
"contract" requirement, may in some circumstances be found inapplicable to an 
"appointment" type of statute. 
Pruitt v Harker, 328 Mo. 1200, 43 S.W.2d 769 (1931), holding it unnecessary 
to show an express contract between a father and his minor son. 
Stegemanv St. Francis Xavier Parish, 611 S.W.2d 204 (Mo 1981) (en banc). 
Claimant, a volunteer worker, was injured on his first day of work on the 
construction of a private school gymnasium. He was held to be an employee 
"under any appointment," under the Missouri definition. Although an "uncom-
pensated worker," he was entitled to benefits based on the average annual 
earnings of an adult in the same class of employment Treatise quoted in majority 
and dissent. 
«o Alaska: Childs v. Kalgin Island Lodge, 779 P 2d 310 (Alaska 1989). 
Treatise cited. 
Arizona: DeVall v Industrial Comm'n, 118 Ariz. 591, 578 P.2d 1020 (1978). 
The claimant was injured while cleaning a motel swimming pool, and filed a claim 
for compensation, alleging that she and her husband were co-managers of the 
motel. The motel owners contended that only the husband was an employee The 
court reversed the commission's denial of benefits, and held that the claimant 
was an employee under an implied contract for hire. She performed much of 
the managenal work while her husband worked at another job, and the owners 
always delivered compensation for the job to the claimant rather than to her 
husband. Treatise cited. 
California: Spradhn v. Cox, 247 Cal. Rptr 347 (1988). 
Kentucky: M.J. Daly Co v. Varney, 695 S W 2d 400 (Ky. 1985) Plaintiff 
brought a tort action for injuries caused by a fire and explosion occurring on 
the premises of defendant's chemical plant. He was employed by a labor service 
company and was on assignment to defendant Plaintiff had exphcitly refused 
to enter into any employment contract with defendant, preferring to stay on 
the payroll with the labor service company. Thus, the court held that plaintiff 
had elected to retain his common law rights to sue defendant in tort rather than 
come under the compensation scheme. His right to bring a tort action was 
upheld. 
Louisiana: Nicholas v Jenkins, 411 So. 2d 631 (La. Ct. App. 1982). Jenkins, 
a truck dnver, had arranged to pay Nicholas and a friend to unload produce 
from his truck at a grocer's warehouse Nicholas was injured during the 
unloading and sought worker's compensation benefits from Jenkins, the trucking 
agency, and the grocer. The court affirmed a summary judgment for the grocer, 
holding that there was no theory under which Nicholas could be considered the 
(Matthew Bender & Co Inc ) (Rel 63-6/91 Pub 340) 
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it is perfectly possible to strike up a master-servant relation 
without a contract, so far as vicarious liability is concerned.61 An 
grocer's employee for compensation purposes. 
James v. Ace Freight Line, Inc., 411 So. 2d 652 (La. Ct. App. 1982). A "truck 
hustler" who was injured while helping a truck driver unload goods at a grocer's 
warehouse was held not to be an employee of either the grocer or the trucking 
company, since his only contract of hire was with the truck driver. 
Maryland: Lockerman v. Prince George's County, 281 Md. 195, 377 A.2d 1177 
(1977). The court affirmed a decision that a juror, who was injured when she 
fell as she was leaving the jury box during her first week of "mandatory" jury 
duty, was not covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act. The requirement 
that there be some "contract of hire," express or implied, to confer status as 
"employee" for purposes of this Act was not met, since jury service was neither 
voluntarily entered nor negotiated for. The juror's decision to serve more than 
the required 25 days could not substitute for a contract for hire. The court noted 
that any exceptions to this requirement must be created by the legislature and 
that no such exception for jurors existed in Maryland. Treatise quoted. 
North Carolina: Harrelson v. Soles, 94 N.C. App. 557, 380 S.E.2d 528 (1989). 
When an employee filed a claim for workers' compensation against the owner 
of a trucking company, alleging that he operated the business as a proprietor, 
the burden of proof was on the alleged employee to show that the business was 
operated as the alter ego of the owner and not as a corporation. If the contract 
of employment was entered into with the corporation, the employee could not 
maintain a claim against the owner individually. 
Oklahoma: In re Death of Worcester, 576 P.2d 1168 (Okla. 1978). Worcester 
had been killed in a vehicular accident while driving a cattle truck belonging 
to Kenneth Cole, d/b/a Cole Trucking Company. The State Industrial Court 
awarded death benefits to Worcester's dependent mother. Cole appealed, 
contending that Worcester was an independent contractor, not an employee. He 
also contended that, even if Worcester had been an employee, he was Cole's only 
employee, and thus the jurisdictional requirement of two employees had not been 
satisfied. The Supreme Court held that both questions were jurisdictional, and 
that they could review all of the facts. The court found that Worcester was an 
employee, on the strength of evidence that Cole owned the truck, paid for all 
maintenance and insurance, and held the operating permits. The court also found 
that transporting livestock was Cole's usual business and that it was a type of 
work usually done by employees. The controversy over the number of employees 
centered on the status of Cole's son, Ronald, who Cole contended was a partner 
rather than an employee. Cole testified that his son had a working interest in 
the business, had decision-making authority in his father's absence, and did not 
receive a salary but drew on the firm's accounts for all of his needs. The court 
found, however, that the trucking company was the sole property of Cole and 
that his son, who received remuneration for his services, was employed under 
an implied contract. Accordingly, the award of death benefits was sustained. 
Treatise quoted. 
6 1
 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 221, comment c; Mechem, Outlines of the 
Law of Agency 328 (3rd ed. 1923). 
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infant, a prisoner, a slave, a helpful house guest—all might 
impose vicarious liability on one who accepted their services 
performed subject to the master's control. 
The reason for the difference between the two concepts is 
readily explained by the difference between the nature of the two 
liabilities involved. The end product of a vicarious liability case 
is not an adjustment of rights between employer and employee 
on the strength of their mutual arrangement, but a unilateral 
liability of the master to a stranger. The sole concern of the 
vicarious liability rule, then, is with the master: Did he accept 
and control the service that led to the stranger's injury? If he did, 
it is of no particular importance between him and the stranger 
whether the servant enjoyed any reciprocal or contractual rights 
vis-a-vis the master. Accordingly, the Restatement of Agency 
(Second) says plainly that the master must consent to the ser-
vice,62 but nowhere requires that the servant consent to serve the 
master63 or even know who he is.64 
Compensation law, however, is a mutual arrangement between 
the employer and employee under which both give up and gain 
certain things. Since the rights to be adjusted are reciprocal 
rights between employer and employee, it is not only logical but 
mandatory to resort to the agreement between them to discover 
their relationship.65 To thrust upon a worker an employee status 
(Text continued on page 8-307) 
Alabama Power Co. v. Beam, 472 So. 2d 619 (Ala. 1985). The fact that a 
contractor's employee might be found to be a servant of the premises owner for 
vicarious liability purposes does not mean that the employee is an employee of 
the owner for compensation purposes. The latter relation requires a contract 
of hire, and the employee's only contract here was with the contractor. 
6 2
 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 221. 
•3 See § 224, subjecting to master-servant type liability one who accepts 
services from another who performs them under duress or compulsion of law. 
6 4
 See § 222, making undisclosed principal liable for acts of a servant, even 
if the servant does not know who his master is. 
6 6
 Lucas v. Li'l General Stores, 25 N.C. App. 190, 212 S.E.2d 525 (1975), 
afd, Lucas v. Li'l General Stores, 289 N.C. 212, 221 S.E.2d 257 (1976). During 
the evening of April 26, 1973, the decedent was shot and killed during a robbery 
while he was operating one of the five stores owned in the Gastonia-Ashville area 
by Li'l General Stores. The decedent had previously been dropped from the 
payroll of the defendant employer at another Li'l General Store on February 
27, 1973, on account of an allegation that he sold beer to a minor. The court 
held that the manager of the store, who knew about the decedent's dismissal 
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at the other Li'l General Store, was acting beyond the scope of his authority 
when he put the decedent back on the payroll. It is well settled that one who 
deals with an agent, knowing that his authority is limited and that he is acting 
beyond its scope, cannot bind the principal. Therefore, the decedent was not 
an "employee" within the Workmen's Compensation Act when he was shot. His 
wife, as the surviving spouse, was not entitled to workmen's compensation upon 
her husband's death. 
See also the following cases: 
Illinois: See discussion of the dissent in Laffoon v. Bell & Zoller Coal Company, 
65 111. 2d 437, 3 111. Dec. 715, 359 N.E.2d 125 (1976), rev'g 27 111. App. 3d 
472, 327 N.E.2d 147 (1975), § 72.31 n.52 infra. Treatise quoted in dissent in 
Supreme Court and cited in dissent in Appellate Court. 
Louisiana: Cf. Williams v. Keystone Gen. Contractors, Inc., 488 So. 2d 999 
(La. 1986), reh'g denied (June 19, 1986). Defendant's president, Wadhams, 
testified that, at the time of the claimant's accident, the claimant had been laid 
off for lack of work. The defendant's employment records also showed that the 
claimant's last pay check was dated prior to the accident. The plaintiff disputed 
that he had been laid off, and also alleged that his pay days were switched from 
weekly to bimonthly, so that his next check was not due until after the accident. 
Other evidence favorable to a finding that the plaintiff was employed after the 
alleged lay-off date included the following: the claimant retained possession of 
a company truck; he obtained a set of bid specifications for the defendant for 
a proposed construction job, furnished a $30 cash deposit, and delivered the 
construction plans to the defendant; and, on the day of the accident, the claimant 
alleged that he was driving the defendant's truck to an appointment with a 
prospective purchaser of a crane owned by the defendant. In addition, Wadham 
sent a sep&rauun notice to the unemployment compensation office in which he 
stated that the claimant's employment ended the day after the accident. Even 
later, Wadham verified the claimant's employment to a lending agency. Wadham 
countered these facts by explaining that the claimant was allowed to use the 
company truck while seeking a loan in order to purchase it, and that he had 
misrepresented the claimant's separation date to the unemployment compensa-
tion agency and to the lending institution because he wanted to help the 
claimant. The trial court dismissed the claimant's case, holding that there was 
no employment relationship between the parties at the time of the accident. The 
Louisiana Supreme Court reversed that decision as clearly erroneous, stressing 
that the only evidence to support such a conclusion was Wadham's own testimony 
and the payroll records, which were entirely in Wadham's control. 
Massachusetts: Thorsen v. Mandell, 402 Mass. 744, 525 N.E.2d 375 (1988). 
Mandell, a theatrical producer, admitted that he had a written agreement with 
Thorsen to work as an actress with his company. The court held that this 
testimony established a "contract of hire" as a matter of law. Thus Mandell was 
liable for the injuries Thorsen sustained while rehearsing for a play and a tort 
verdict against him as an uninsured employer was upheld. 
North Carolina: Dockery v. McMillan, 85 N.C. App. 469, 355 S.E.2d 153 
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(1987), review denied, 320 N.C. 167 (1987). A father and son were partners in 
a roofing business. Due to a back problem the father withdrew from the 
partnership and began to receive social security disability payments. The son 
continued on in the roofing business, with the father occasionally helping him 
out. On one such occasion the father fell from a roof and was killed. His widow 
filed a claim for survivor's benefits. The deputy commissioner determined that 
the deceased was not an employee and that there was no jurisdiction, therefore, 
to hear the claim. The full commission affirmed, with one commissioner dissent-
ing. The court of appeals reversed. Since the case had been decided on 
jurisdictional grounds the court of appeals was free to consider the entire record 
and make a determination as to whether the deceased was an employee. While 
there may have been no written contract of employment between the parties and 
while the father may have worked for variable consideration in order to help 
his son get established in the business, the Commission erred in determining 
that no employment relationship existed. There was an implied oral contract 
of employment. Payment need not be in the form of money. The case was 
remanded for proceedings consistent with a finding of employment. Treatise 
cited. 
Novenson v. Spokane Culvert & Fabricating Co., 91 Wash. 2d 550, 588 P.2d 
1174 (1979). The employee of a temporary employment agency was injured while 
working for a customer of the agency. He received benefits under the Washington 
Industrial Insurance Act, but then brought an action for negligence against the 
customer. The court noted that an employment relationship could only have 
existed if (1) the employer had the right to control the servant's physical conduct 
in the performance of his duties, and (2) there was consent by the employee to 
the relationship. In a 5-4 decision the court held that the worker was not an 
employee of the customer in view of the fact that he was not placed on the 
customer's payroll and was not entitled to company benefits. The customer 
therefore was subject to the common law action. In a dissenting opinion, 
Dolliver, J., and three other justices argued that there was sufficient evidence 
to show that the worker had consented to the employment relationship. Treatise 
quoted. 
Franklin v. Puget Sound Tug & Barge Co., 21 Wash. App. 517, 586 P.2d 489 
(1978). J & D, a partnership, contracted to do some sandblasting of pallets for 
a tug company. When the tug company was dissatisfied with the work progress 
and asked J & D to hire more help, J & D hired two men and another company, 
Sunco. Sunco worked the night shift. One of J & D's men was crushed when 
a pallet, which had been lying on its side without any bracing, fell on him. In 
an action brought by the employee's estate against the tug company, the issue 
on appeal was whether J & D was an independent contractor, so that the tug 
company owed no duty to its employees. The court listed several relevant factors, 
pointing out that all of them related to the crucial factor of the right of control 
over the manner, method and means by which the work was to be performed. 
The extent of control needed was only over those activities from which the 
actionable negligence flowed. The court held there was substantial evidence that 
the tug company had the right to control part of J & D's operation, including 
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to which he has never consented would not ordinarily harm him 
in a vicarious liability suit by a stranger against his employer, 
but it might well deprive him of valuable rights under the compen-
sation act, notably the right to sue his own employer for common-
law damages. This reasoning applies not only to the question 
whether there is any employment relation at all, but also to the 
question whether one of two or more persons is an employer.651 
(Text continued on page 8-309) 
supplying the materials, moving and inspecting the pallets and directing J & 
D to hire more help. The tug company also faced liability under the rule that, 
when a general contractor retains some control over the work of an independent 
contractor, the general contractor has a duty, within the scope of that control, 
to provide a safe place to work. Although these facts indicated that the tug 
company was an employer, the court noted finally that no employer-employee 
relationship could exist without the workman's consent. Because there was no 
evidence that the decedent consented to such a relationship with the tug 
company, the relationship did not exist and the exclusiveness provisions of the 
Washington Act did not bar the wrongful death action against the tug company. 
*** Alabama: Ex Parte Stewart, 518 So. 2d 118, writ denied, 518 So. 2d 125 
(Ala. 1987). Stewart, resident manager of an apartment complex, sued Carter 
Realty, the rental and management agent, for injuries received in a fire. The 
court below had held that the owners were the employer, not Carter. The supreme 
court reversed, stressing that there could be more than one employer if both 
had some control. But control was not the primary test when the issue was which 
of two persons was the employer. For that purpose, the contract between the 
parties was most important. The case was remanded for reconsideration in the 
light of these and other principles that the court lucidly expounded. Treatise 
quoted. 
Arizona: Young v. Environmental Air Prods., Inc., 136 Ariz. 158, 665 P.2d 
40 (1983). The defendant, EAP, had originally begun construction of a new 
building. After this construction was stopped because EAP was not a registered 
contractor, EAP contracted with a registered contractor, Cimetta, to complete 
the project. Young was hired directly by Cimetta to work on the project. Mason, 
who had been working on the project for EAP, went off the EAP payroll and 
onto Cimetta's, During construction, Young and Mason were both injured when 
the building collapsed, due to the negligence of the EAP employee who was 
supervising the project. In Young and Mason s subsequent tort action against 
EAP, the jury awarded damages to both men. EAP brought this appeal, 
contending that the plaintiffs were statutory employees so that EAP was entitled 
to tort immunity. The supreme court held that the appellate court's consent 
requirement for statutory employer status was misdirected. The court relied on 
this author's characterization of the consent question as peculiar to lent 
employee relationships (see the companion case, Word, § 48.10 n.36 infra). As 
a result, the court held that consent was not a requirement for classification 
as a statutory employer. Instead, the correct tests to apply when determining 
the existence of a statutory employment relationship are the extent of supervi-
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sion and control and whether the work involved is part of the employer's regular 
trade or business. Under the facts before the court, the plaintiffs' work on the 
construction of EAP's new building was not part of EAP's regular operation. 
The court of appeals decision was affirmed as modified by the analysis set out 
above for determining if a remote employer is immunized under the statutory 
employer doctrine. Treatise quoted. 
Florida: Edward J. Gerritts, Inc. v. McKinney, 410 So. 2d 542 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1982). The claimants' husbands had been killed in an on-the-job 
accident in Saudi Arabia. The men had been hired for work on the Saudi Arabian 
project by Michael Gerritts, who was an officer and shareholder of Edward J. 
Gerritts, Inc. (G. Inc.), as well as the managing director of Ashemimry-Stirr 
Construction Co. (A-S), which was actually doing the work in Saudi Arabia. 
There was some confusion over whether Michael had hired the men on behalf 
of G. Inc. or A-S. The court found that Michael used G. Inc.'s Florida offices 
to hire the men and make all of their travel arrangements, and that the men, 
who were paid in cash, were never directly informed who their employer was. 
The court held that the men had reasonably relied on Michael's representations, 
made in his capacity as an officer of G. Inc., that G. Inc. was their employer. 
Accordingly, G. Inc. was held liable for paying workers' compensation death 
benefits to the widows. 
Georgia: Goolsby v. Wilson, 150 Ga. App. 611, 258 S.E.2d 216 (1979). A 
brewery sold a certain lot of beer to a sales company, which in turn contracted 
with a transport company to ship the beer. The driver hired by the transport 
company was killed in an accident while transporting the beer, and his wife 
sought death benefits from the brewery, since the other parties had fewer than 
three employees in Georgia and were not subject to the Workers' Compensation 
Act. The court held that the brewery was not the decedent's employer, because 
there was no contractual relation, and affirmed the denial of compensation. 
Oconee County v. Rowland, 107 Ga. App. 108, 129 S.E.2d 373 (1962). School 
principal had authority to hire the repairman who then became an employee of 
the county board of education, although the repairman's wages came from a 
school fund collected by the students rather than from officially allocated school 
tax funds. 
Iowa: Beck v. Rounds, 332 N.W.2d 109 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982). A father and 
son leased separate plots of farmland. Both men worked on both farms. The 
claimant was injured while he was working on the father's machinery with the 
son at the father's direction. The claimant took orders from both men. The court 
held that he was an employee of both the father and the son and affirmed the 
agency's award of worker's compensation benefits. 
Missouri: Hailock v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 364 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1963). Pilot employed by Ethiopian Air Lines did not have employment contract 
with TWA, which had acted merely as an agent for the Ethiopian Air Lines in 
obtaining personnel for the foreign company. Compensation claim against TWA 
denied. 
New York: Lehnon v. Kaiser, 75 A.D.2d 705, 427 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1980). Kaiser 
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In such cases, with all the elements of employment having been 
established as to some employer, the issue may be solely whether 
the particular defendant made a contract with the particular 
employee.65-2 
and Benson were partners in the roofing business pursuant to an oral partnership 
agreement. On the date in question Benson brought the claimant to the current 
work site in order that the claimant might learn something of the roofing 
business. The claimant that day fell off the roof which was being repaired and 
suffered injuries. On a previous occasion, Benson had paid the claimant for a 
day's work. Despite conflicting testimony as to whether Kaiser had accepted 
the claimant as an employee of the partnership, and whether Kaiser had actually 
given the claimant work instructions, the Board's determination that the 
claimant was an employee for compensation purposes was affirmed. 
North v, Richards, 283 App. Div. 21, 126 N.Y.S.2d 241 (1953). Wife held 
not jointly liable with husband for compensation injuries sustained by domestic 
servant while making bed, because it was not shown that she did more then 
merely approve of selection and direct what the servant was to do. 
Oklahoma: McCowan v. Ford, 495 P.2d 1283 (Okla. 1972). Claimant pur-
chased a tractor from defendant, and when the tractor was delivered it was found 
not to be in operating condition. One of defendant's employees attempted to 
repair it, and requested that claimant assist. While doing so claimant was injured 
and sought compensation benefits. The court held that the mere fact that there 
was a benefit to defendant did not create an employer-employee relationship and 
therefore compensation was not payable. 
Texas: Maryland Cas. Co. v. Sullivan, 160 Tex. 592, 334 S.W.2d 783 (1960). 
The employee was hired by one Bavousett to pilot crop-dusting planes. Within 
a short period both the employee and Bavousett were killed in separate plane 
crashes, and the contract of employment had to be determined by circumstantial 
evidence alone. Bavousett operated three businesses: the first a plane rental 
company, the second a crop-dusting company, and the third primarily a fertilizer 
company, whose letterhead included the words, "Insecticides—Fertilizers— 
Fungicides—Hormones—Weed Sprays—Dusters." The particular dusting job 
was billed on the fertilizer company's letterhead, but the deceased pilot's pay 
check was written on a crop-dusting company check. The court found there was 
sufficient evidence to warrant a jury finding that the fertilizer company had been 
the employer. 
•
s
-
2
 In determining the parties to the employment contract, custom and 
knowledge may be decisive. 
Cross v. Crabtree, 364 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962). Five roofers had by 
custom worked together. If one received a job offer, they all worked at the project 
and split the proceeds according to the method of pay. A builder who had 
contracted one of the five and who knew of their custom was held to be an 
employer of another in the group who was fatally injured. 
Hearing v. Johnson, 105 Ga. App. 408, 124 S.E.2d 655 (1962). A truck driver 
hired a substitute driver to make a short trip for him. Normally an employee 
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There is also a sound reason for the requirement that the 
employment be "for hire." In a vicarious liability suit, payment 
is not a requisite of servant status, since the stranger's rights 
against the master could not possibly be affected by the presence 
or absence of financial arrangements between the master and 
servant.66 But in a compensation case, the entire philosophy of 
the legislation assumes that the worker is in a gainful occupation 
at the time of injury. The essence of compensation protection is 
the restoration of a part of the loss of wages which are assumed 
to have existed. Merely as a practical matter, it would be impossi-
ble to calculate compensation benefits for a purely gratuitous 
worker, since benefits are ordinarily calculated on the basis of 
earnings. 
These, then, are the underlying reasons why compensation acts 
usually insist upon a contract of hire. They should be borne in 
mind during the consideration of the particular applications of 
the contract requirement which follow, with a view to distinguish-
ing legitimate uses of the requirement from purely technical 
applications having nothing to do with the reason or spirit of the 
rule. 
§ 47.20 Contractual disability: spouse or child 
At this writing, the question whether one spouse can be the 
employee of the other for compensation purposes6 6 1 has been 
presented judicially in seven jurisdictions. Two have denied 
of an employee is not an employee of the original employer. In the instant case, 
custom and ratification by the employer established an employment relation 
between the employer and the substitute driver. 
See generally, § 48 infra on lent employees and joint and dual employment. 
6 6
 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 225. 
•••
l
 Two states deal explicitly with the question in their compensation acts. 
Idaho, by statute, excludes members of the employer's family "dwelling in 
his household" from the definition of "employee." Idaho Code Ann § 72-105A 
(Supp. 1965). 
Michigan, by statute, includes within the term "employee" husbands or wives 
who are regularly employed by their spouses on a full-time basis at a specified 
rate of pay with specified hours of employment, unless they are specifically 
excluded from the policy of compensation insurance. Mich. Stat. Ann. 
§ 17.147(2). 
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compensation, on the ground that the married women's acts had 
not jvt gone so far as to empower the wife to make a contract 
of employment v^  ith her husband.67 Five have awarded compensa-
tion, taking a broader view of the purposes both of the compensa-
tion acts and of the married women's acts.68 
To some extent this cleavage may be attributed to the difference 
in the married v men's acts applied. In Pennsylvania, for exam-
ple, mam* s nen are given full power to contract, subject to 
two immateiidi exceptions; but in New Jersey, the wife's contrac-
tual powers are specifically set forth. In the successful claims in 
Iowa and West Virginia, the defendants relied not so much on 
the disability of a wife to contract with her husband as on the 
disability of the wife to sue her husband. Both courts answered 
this argument, not by passing on the question whether the wife 
could bring such a suit, but by asserting that compensation 
6 7
 llhnoxa: Wilhelm v. Industrial Comm'n, 399 111. 80, 77 N.E.2d 174 (1948). 
Massachusetts: Flaherty's Case, 324 Mass. 755, 85 N.E.2d 331 (1949) 
In re Humphrey, 227 Mass. 166, 116 N.E. 412, 1918F, L R.A. 193 (1917). 
The Massachusetts statute was amended in 1963, however, to authorize husband-
wife contracts Ann. Laws of Mass. C. 209 § 2 (1963). 
Montana: In 1989, Montana excluded from coverage members of an employer's 
family for whom an exemption could be claimed under the Internal Revenue 
Code. 
But cf Cottnll v. Cottnll Sodding Serv., 744 P.2d 895 (Mont 19B7) Applying 
the rational relationship test, the court held unconstitutional a statutory 
provision excluding from coverage members of the employer's family who reside 
in the employer's household. 
— Iowa: Reid v. Reid, 216 Iowa 882, 249 N.W 387 (1933) 
Nebraska: McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 230 Neb. 460, 432 N W.2d 45 (1988) 
The Workers' Compensation Court awarded the claimant, Cindy McLaughlin, 
benefits for injuries sustained when she fell while loading trucks for her 
husband's business. The Workers' Compensation Court found that the claimant 
was an employee and entitled to benefits under the Workers' Compensation Law 
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Compensation Court's findings 
will not be set aside unless such findings are clearly erroneous In the instant 
case, the record supported the findings of the Compensation Court. 
New Jersey: Romeo v Romeo, 84 N.J. 289, 418 A.2d 258 (1980), Treatise 
quoted, overruling Bendler v. Bendler, 3 N J. 161, 69 A.2d 302 (1949) 
Pennsylvania: Nesbit v. Nesbit, 102 Pa. Super. 554, 157 A. 519 (1931). 
West Vxrgima: Flynn v. State Compensation Comm'r, 141 W Va. 445, 91 
S.E.2d 156 (1956), involving husband employed by wife. 
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proceedings were not litigation and that a common-law disability 
to sue was therefore immaterial. 
New Jersey at first adhered to the rule of interspousal immuni-
ty,681 but abrogated that rule in 1980 in Romeo v. Romeo. M 2 Mrs. 
Romeo, who owned and operated a tavern and restaurant, em-
ployed her husband as a full-time employee whose duties included 
doing the banking for the business. One one such trip, he failed 
to return from the bank after cashing over $9,000 in checks. His 
body was later found under circumstances which suggested that 
he has been waylaid, robbed and shot. Mrs. Romeo's claim for 
dependency benefits was granted by the compensation board, but 
reversed by the Appellate Division, which held that it was bound 
by Bendler. The New Jersey Supreme Court, noting that the 
Bendler decision had been criticized by this commentator, over-
ruled Bendler and reinstated the award. The court, which had 
previously abrogated interspousal immunity for tort claims, held 
that the common-law rule against enforcing interspousal contracts 
should not be allowed to bar recovery under the workers' compen-
sation act. Although the court acknowledged that an across-the-
board enforcement of interspousal contracts might create prob-
lems in an action for breach of such a contract, it noted that the 
past uncritical rule against enforcement could become an instru-
ment of injustice. 
The presentation of the instant question in any jurisdiction 
must necessarily be attended by the entire complex decisional and 
statutory background of married women's contracts in the partic-
ular state. When the statutes expressly give the wife capacity to 
make a contract of hire with her husband,69 or give her general 
power to contract subject to exceptions not here relevant, courts 
should and do award compensation, unembarrassed by any consid-
eration of the question whether common-law litigation between 
the two is possible. At the other extreme, it is difficult to see how 
anything short of legislative amendment could overcome the effect 
of the Illinois statute which says: "Neither husband nor wife shall 
be entitled to recover any compensation for any labor performed 
or services rendered for the other, whether in the management 
G8-1 Bendler v. Bendler, n.68 immediately supra under New Jersey. 
6 8 2
 See n.68 supra this subsection. Treatise quoted. 
•»£.0., Cal. Civ. Code §§ 158-159. 
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of property or otherwise."70 True, this statute acts merely upon 
enforceability. But so point-blank a legislative declaration hardly 
seems compatible with the existence of a "contract of hire," since 
a legal wage obligation cannot exist. Between these extremes are 
backgrounds such as New Jersey's, in which the decision, as the 
dissent71 in the Bendler case shows, could have gone either way. 
Husband-wife contracts there are not legally enforceable, but are 
enforceable in equity, which, as the dissent argues, should suffice 
for present purposes. If the law is flexible enough to permit the 
adaptation whereby equity modified the rigors of the legal rule 
on husband-wife contracts, surely in modern times it is flexible 
enough to permit a similar adaptation 10 current conditions, as 
represented by the emergence of compensation legislation and the 
independent working status of many married women. There are 
millions of married women gainfully employed in this country, and 
hundreds of thousands who are business proprietors and execu-
tives. Of these, many work for or employ their husbands. It is 
anachronistic indeed to deprive the spouse of compensation 
protection, when in every other respect the status is one of 
employment, merely on the strength of an obsolete rule left over 
from a time when the only services that could be affected by such 
a rule were domestic services which the spouse was bound in any 
case to perform by the obligations of the marriage relation. 
This general attitude disfavoring technical husband-wife con-
tract disability appears to have widespread acceptance, and most 
courts will get round the disability if there is any possible legal 
ground on which to do so. For example, in one case the insurer 
was held liable for compensation to the husband of the employer-
wife on the pure ground of estoppel, based upon the acceptance 
of premiums on a payroll including the husband's name.72 More-
over, in states which ordinarily would say that a partnership is 
not an entity but an aggregate of its members, it has been twice 
™ 111. Rev. Stat., ch. 68, § 8 (1945). 
7 1
 See dissent of Ackerson, J., concurred in by Vanderbilt, C.J., 69 A.2d at 
308. 
7
*McLain v. National Mut. Cas. Co., 28 So. 2d 680 (La Ct. App. 1946) 
Cf. Lucas v. State Indus. Ace. Comm'n, 222 Or. 420, 353 P.2d 223 (1960). 
The workman sustained an injury which would have entitled him to compensation 
but for the fact that he was a relative and no notice for protection of this person 
had been given to the Commission. 
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held that a husband can be an employee of a partnership of which 
his wife is a member. In one case the husband himself recovered 
compensation from a partnership of which his wife was one of two 
members.73 In the other, the wife herself recovered death benefits 
from her own partnership for the death of the employee hus-
band.74 
The problem of minor children as employees of their own 
parents is not quite so difficult,79 since it is always possible to 
say that the act of making an express contract of hire with the 
minor child is in itself a partial emancipation removing, to that 
7 3
 Klemmens v North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 54 N D 
496, 209 N.W. 972 (1926). 
7
«Keegan v Keegan, 194 Minn. 261, 260 N W. 318 (1935). 
™ Kansas: Dressier v. Dressier, 167 Kan. 749, 208 P.2d 271 (1949). 
Mtcktgan- Van Sweden v. Van Sweden, 250 Mich. 238, 230 N.W 191 (1930) 
Montana: Bennett v. Bennett, 637 P.2d 512 (Mont 1981) Claimant, the son 
of the employer, sought compensation for a leg injury which he sustained dunng 
the initial weeks of his employment. The State Fund had denied coverage for 
the following reasons: (1) the employer had agreed to the coverage not being 
extended to members of his immediate family, and (2) the employer had elected 
to cover his son after the injury had occurred The court held the claimant's 
injury to be compensable. Its holding was based on a finding that the Division 
of Workers' Compensation failed to publish rules governing the time and method 
of electing coverage for members of an employer's family dwelling in the 
employer's household. The record showed that the employer, to the best of his 
abilities, had followed the Division's instructions in providing coverage for his 
son. 
See also n.67 supra this subsection. 
New Jersey: Williams v. Williams, 91 N J Super. 273, 219 A 2d 895 (1966). 
Claimant was found to be a bona fide employee of his father's firm This created 
a partial emancipation of the son, which permitted him to sue for workmen's 
compensation. Treatise cited. 
North Dakota: Denius v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 68 
N.D. 506, 281 N W 361 (1938). 
Texas: Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Mernfield, 331 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1959). The minor son, employed by his father at a gas station, was injured 
in the course of employment. The son was carried on the regular payroll and 
was paid wages similar to other employees. Although the father would be entitled 
in common law to the minor son's earnings regardless of where the minor was 
employed, the minor was held to be an employee entitled to compensation 
benefits. 
Washington: Cheney v. Department of Labor & Indus , 175 Wash. 60, 26 P 2d 
393 (1933). 
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extent, any disability which might otherwise exist. And as with 
spouses, the fact that the employer is a partnership of which the 
father is a member is usually enough to tip the balance in favor 
of compensability.76 The question here is usually that of distin-
guishing between a bona fide express contract of hire and the kind 
of informal or irregular services and payments that might be 
expected within a family. The denials of compensation to minor 
children in reported cases have all been based on failure to show 
an express contract of hire/7 or on an express statutory exclu-
sion,771 not on any technical disability of the sort that causes 
embarrassment in the husband-wife cases. 
(Text continued on page 8-317) 
7
« Carter v. Carter Logging Co , 83 Idaho 50, 357 P 2d 660 (1960). The 
claimant, a 19-year-old boy, lived at home and worked for his father's logging 
operation. The court held that, since the logging company was a partnership, 
the boy did not fall within the exemption of members of the employer s family. 
See also Williams v. Williams, n 75 immediately supra, under New Jersey. 
7 7
 California: Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 175 Cal. 91, 
165 P. 15 (1917). 
Louisiana. Caldwell v. Caldwell, 55 So 2d 258 (La. Ct. App. 1951) Pact that 
father intermittently and irregularly advanced cash to his minor son, who lived 
at home, for services rendered by him did not create employment status. Under 
the law the son owed this duty of rendering service without demanding compen-
sation. The court treated the sum of about $35 a week as an allowance, arrived 
at in order to stop the excessive demands for money. 
Michigan: Lambard v. Sage Food Serv., Inc., 127 Mich. App. 262, 338 N.W 2d 
207 (1983). Applying the "economic reality" test, the court found no employee-
employer relationship between a father, who was a cook, and his son. The father 
had invested in the son's restaurant, advised him on equipment and floor plans, 
and acted as a public relations person. However, the father had set his own hours 
and received no wages. 
Minnesota: Supornick v. Supornick, 175 Minn. 579, 222 N W. 275 (1928). 
Nebraska: Holt County v. Mullen, 126 Neb. 102, 252 N.W. 799 (1934). 
New Jersey Estes v. Estes, 15 N.J Misc 305, 191 A. 107 (1937). 
Washington: Hillestad v. Industrial Ins. Comm'n, 80 Wash. 426, 141 P. 913 
(1914). 
7 7
 * Iowa: See also Ross v. Ross, 308 N.W 2d 50 (Iowa 1981) The Iowa statute 
excluding from coverage children of employers and children and relatives of 
farm employers was not unconstitutional under the rational basis text, in view 
of the differences between the farm economy and employment generally 
Michigan: Higgins v Monroe Evening News, 404 Mich. 1, 272 N.W.2d 537 
(1978). A five-year-old was hit by a car while accompanying his brother on his 
paper route, and sought workmen's compensation. The court found that an 
employment relationship had no minimum pay or age requirements. The issue 
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boiled down to whether the paper boy's offer of a dime to his brother for help 
on his route was a contract for hire or merely an attempt to get the five year 
old out of the house, as his mother had requested. The court found the dime 
to be a gratuitous reward for helping and denied compensation The dissent 
found an employment relationship The court also held that the Hittle Juvenile 
Employment Act, creating the so-called "street trade" exemption to the illegal 
employment of minors, was not unconstitutional. That Act provides: 
Nothing in this act shall apply to or prohibit any minor from engaging m 
(a) Street trades, except as prohibited under section 23; 
(b) Domestic work or chores in connection with private residences; 
(c) Farm work; 
(d) Employment in a trade m which the parent or duly appointed guardian 
of such minor is self-employed; 
(e) Employment in a business owned and operated by such parent or 
guardian. 
For the purposes of this provision, a business shall be deemed to be owned 
by such parent or guardian if he is either the sole owner, partner or 
stockholder therein and shall be deemed to be operated by him if he devotes 
substantially all his normal working hours to the operation of such business. 
In the event that such minor is required by law to attend school, then such 
work may only be performed outside of school hours. 
(f) Employment on a camp site of a non-profit corporation engaged in 
citizenship training and character building during periods of school vacations. 
M.C L § 409 14, M S.A. § 17.714 
The term "street trade" shall be deemed to refer to any 1 or more of the 
following occupations. 
(a) Soliciting subscriptions for newspapers, magazines or other periodicals; 
(b) Distributing, selling or offering for sale newspapers, magazines, periodi-
cals, advertising matter; 
(c) Boot blacking; 
(d) Selling or offering for sale of popcorn, peanuts, candy, fruit and soft 
drinks in concessions owned and operated by a boy scout troop, girl scout 
troop, or any other youth organization. 
Provided, that the same is conducted in a public place. 
M.C.L. § 409.28; M S.A. § 17.728 Treatise quoted 
New York, But cf Pecor v Pecor, 77 A D 2d 704, 430 N Y S 2d 702 (1980). 
The 17-year-old claimant had been employed for four years on his father's family 
dairy farm He operated the cattle-feeding system, and was paid wages on the 
farm payroll. The statute limited the term "employee" to exclude the minor child 
of a farmer employer, in the absence of an express contract of hire The court 
reversed the Board's denial of compensation, holding that the statute does not 
require a written contract, the term "express contract" was only intended to 
exclude implied contracts. 
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although the in-between entity that received the funds and paid 
the worker may be held secondarily96-5 or even jointly liable.98-6 
§ 47.40 Necessity for payment 
§ 47.41 Gratuitous workers 
The word "hire" connotes payment of some kind. By contrast 
with the common law of master and servant, which recognized the 
possibility of having a gratuitous servant,99 and apart from 
CETA worker was held the employee of the township, since the township 
controlled the work, although the CETA program was federally funded. A tort 
suit was accordingly barred. 
But cf. County of Armstrong v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 81 Pa. Commw. 
474, 473 A.2d 755 (1984). For purposes of workers' compensation, a CETA 
employee was an employee of the "prime sponsor", the recipient of federal funds 
for the payment of wages and compensation premiums, and not of the borough 
which supervised and directed his daily work. Here, the county was the sponsor 
of the program, paid the employee's wages and provided compensation coverage. 
The county also controlled his vacation schedule and retained the authority to 
fire him. Evidence of control, or the right to control, is the most important factor 
in the determination, the court held. 
Virginia: Southeastern Tidewater Area Manpower Auth. v. Coley, 221 Va. 859, 
275 S.E.2d 589 (1981). Tidewater was a consortium of cities and counties to 
receive and funnel CETA funds. Claimant worked for a nonprofit uninsured 
organization providing registration assistance, etc. Tidewater was held not to 
be the statutory employer of claimant. The principal test applied was whether 
the work being done was of the kind normally done by the statutory employer's 
own employees, and by that test, claimant was clearly not a statutory employee. 
"•* City of Franklin v. Department of Human Resources, n.98.4 immediately 
supra under Kentucky. 
M * Sebastian County v. Leyva, 617 S.W.2d 387 (Ark. Ct. App. 1981). CETA 
employee held "dual employee" of both county and development district. The 
employee was paid exclusively by the county, but had been placed with the 
development district as coordinator. 
Godley v. County of Pitt, 306 N.C. 357, 293 S.E.2d 167 (1982), rev'g 54 N.C. 
Ap? 324, 283 S.E.2d 430 (1981). The claimant, a CETA employee, had been 
hired, and was paid, by the county, but he was assigned to work for the town 
of Winterville, which supervised his work and set his hours and duties. The 
Supreme Court held that, no matter who was technically the employer, the county 
and its carrier were estopped to deny ^ability. The court pointed out that this 
also offered greater protection in cases in which the immediate "employer" might 
be some volunteer group without compensation coverage. 
9 9
 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 225: "One who volunteers services without 
an agreement for or expectation of reward may be a servant of the one accepting 
such services." ' 
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specific statutory exception,100 the compensation decisions uni-
formly exclude from the definition of "employee" workers who 
neither receive nor expect to receive any kind of pay for their 
services.1 
(Text continued on page 8-351) 
1 0
°TerKeurst v. United States, 549 F. Supp. 455 (W.D. Mich. 1982). The 
plaintiffs husband had been killed in the crash of a U.S. Forest Service plane. 
Prior to boarding the plane, the decedent had signed an "Agreement for 
Voluntary Services" with the Forest Service. The contract provided that the 
decedent's work as an unpaid Forest Service volunteer would not give him the 
status of a federal employee except "for the purpose of tort claims and compensa-
tion for work injuries." In this Federal Tort Claims Act suit by the decedent's 
widow, the court granted the government's motion for summary judgment on 
the ground that the action was barred by the exclusive remedy provision of 
FECA. In addition to the contract signed by the decedent, 16 U.S.C. § 558(c) 
specifically provides that volunteers in decedent's position are to be considered 
employees for FECA purposes. And, even though the decedent had not yet 
performed any volunteer "services," he had reported to work prior to the 
accident. Thus, since the decedent was already under the control of Forest 
Service supervisors, he was within the course of his "employment" when he was 
killed. 
1
 Federal: Symanowicz v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 672 F.2d 638 (7th 
Cir. 1982). The claimant was an officer and director of a Japanese automobile 
repair company which, until about two weeks prior to his injury, had operated 
repair services for the Exchange Service at bases in Misawa and Fuchu, Japan, 
and continued to operate at least one other base in Japan. An employer at the 
Fuchu exchange had asked the claimant to bring him some tires from the Misawa 
base. In response to this request, the claimant had cancelled his airplane 
reservations and had started for Fuchu in a car containing the requested tires 
when he was injured in an automobile accident. His claim for compensation 
benefits against the Exchange Service was denied. The Seventh Circuit affirmed 
the denial, holding that, because the claimant had no agreement to be paid for 
his services, he was not an employee of the Exchange Service, but a mere 
volunteer. Treatise quoted. 
Alabama: Hayes v. City of Lanett, 418 So. 2d 907 (Ala. Ct. App. 1982). 
Claimant was employed by the city in the gas department. He also occasionally 
served as an auxiliary policeman on off days, but without pay. He was acciden-
tally shot while in the latter capacity. The court found the absence of wages 
to be an absolute obstacle to employment status, under the clear language of 
the statute. The definition of "employer" includes the words: "pays wages 
directly to such person." The definition of employee requires a "contract of hire." 
Downey, a prisoner case noted at § 47.31 n.78, was found controlling. 
Arizona: Freedman v. Wolfswinkel, 19 Ariz. App. 307, 506 P.2d 1092 (1973). 
Claimant'8 deceased, who had recently passed the real estate salesman licensing 
test, was acting as a hostess for guests of some real estate developers at a 
reception on their premises. She was receiving no compensation beyond her 
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expen es, and, perhaps, the experience attendant to the task She was killed in 
the course of her activities. The de\ elopers sought to limit any potential recovery 
to workmen's compensation. The court allowed an action in tort, ruling that 
claimant's deceased had not been an employee for workmen's compensation 
purposes 
Illinois. Wolverine Ins Co v Jockish, 83 111. App. 3d 411, 403 N.E.2d 1290 
(1980) Hood enlisted the aid of Jockish in retrieving a disabled semi-truck. The 
two had had previous business dealings in the form of the lease of Jockish's 
rig to Hood. But on this occasion, the court concluded that this was a gratuitous 
undertaking among neighbors and friends. The nght to control and direct the 
details of an endeavor was not controlling in determining whether an employer-
employee relationship existed between the injured party, Jockish, and the person 
in authority, Hood, when there existed no mutual contract for hire between them. 
Hood had never withheld federal income tax or social security tax payments 
for Jockish Jockish had no sound expectation of payment for his services, had 
never performed day labor for Hood, and was never included in computation 
of unemployment of workmen's compensation for Hood's business. 
Board of Educ. v. Industrial Comm'n, 57 111. 2d 330, 312 N E.2d 244 (1974). 
The claimant was held to be an employee of the Board of Education when 
performing her duties as lunchroom supervisor although she was a volunteer 
where her other activities for the school were concerned. She was paid $52 a 
month by the PTA for the lunchroom duties The principal testified that she 
knew that the claimant was paia the PTA. She and the assistant principal 
supervised the claimant's work, % ing the power to terminate claimant's 
services if her work was unsatisfactory The claimant considered herself an 
employee of the school, and the monthly payment a straight salary. As long as 
there was some kind of pav, it was not essential that it be paid monthly by the 
school There was an employer employee relationship because claimant was 
subject to the control and dir* ion of the school pnncipal Treatise quoted. 
Iowa: Uhe v Central State*. eatre Corp., 139 N W 2d 538 (Iowa 1966). 
Claimant had worked for defendant moving picture theater several years 
previously and when he ft for another job was given a free pass While so 
employed he had shot off fireworks for the theater on the Fourth of July He 
continued to do so for Sax vears after leaving, and was injured the last time 
He was paid the first two tidies, but received nothing afterwards Held. This 
was a mere gratuitous employment, since responsibility for payment of wages 
is one of the necessary elements of the employer-employee relationship. 
Kentucky: Kentucky Farm & Power Equip Dealers Ass'n, Inc v Fulkerson 
Bros., Inc., 631 S.W 2d 633 (Ky. 1982) The claimant was vice-president of 
Fulkerson Brothers, a farm equipment dealership, and president of the dealers' 
association He was seriously injured while t r a i l i ng to attend a farm equipment 
dealers' convention in his capacity as president of association. The only issue 
on this appeal was whether claimant was an employee of the association at the 
time of the accident The court held that, since the claimant neither received 
nor expected any wages from the association, he was not an employee Although 
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a statute includes "every executive officer of a corporation" within its definition 
of "employee," the court held that the definition impliedly referred to hired 
rather than voluntary officers. Treatise cited. 
Louisiana: Dupre v. Sterling Plate Glass & Paint Co., Inc., 344 So. 2d 1060 
(La. Ct. App. 1977). The plaintiff was employed by Sterling, a subcontractor 
on a construction project. Returning to work from his coffee break, the plaintiff 
noticed that an employee of Standard, another subcontractor, was having 
difficulty lowering a pipe by rope through a floor-to-ceiling opening in the 
building. The plaintiff went to the side of the opening and attempted to kick 
the pipe loose. In so doing he fell five stories. The trial court held that the 
plaintiff was not a borrowed employee of Standard's at the time of the accident, 
and ordered Sterling and the general contractor to pay compensation. The 
judgment was affirmed on appeal. 
Minnesota: Firkus v. Murphy, 246 N.W.2d 864 (Minn. 1976). The defendant, 
an independent logger, was given a ride to his tractor in the woods by the 
decedent. While the defendant drove his tractor, the decedent voluntarily did 
some work that the defendant would have done otherwise. When the defendant 
dismounted the tractor, the decedent mounted and refused to get off when 
requested to by the defendant. While thereafter driving under the defendant's 
instruction, the decedent tipped the tractor and was killed. A finding that he 
was not an employee was affirmed, primarily on the basis of the plaintiff widow's 
failure to show that the decedent was to have been paid. 
Missouri: Williams v. City of St. Louis, 583 S.W.2d 556 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979). 
The claimant had been employed as a deputy sheriff by the City of St. Louis 
Sheriffs Department. After his employment had been terminated, he continued 
to visit the office on a continuous but sporadic basis. During his visits he would, 
on occasion, gratuitously help the deputy sheriffs who were engaged in the 
performance of their duties. During one such visit, claimant asked a deputy 
sheriff if he could assist him in escorting prisoners to the City Jail. The deputy 
sheriff assented. A scuffle with the prisoners arose en route, resulting in 
permanent damage to claimant's left eye. The Commission affirmed the referee's 
decision that the claimant was not an employee and denied compensation. On 
further appeal, the court held that there was substantial evidence to support 
the Commission's judgment, based in part on the claimant's own testimony, that 
the claimant was not in the service of nor under the control of the Sheriff's 
Department. The acquiescence of the deputy sheriffs in the claimant's visits did 
not constitute the degree of control required to establish an appointment or 
election. 
Montana: See Kimball v. Continental Oil Company, 550 P.2d 912 (Mont. 1976). 
The decedent was filling in for his friend, a bulk plant operator, when he received 
severe burns, which later led to his death. The decedent's widow filed a claim, 
and received compensation benefits and medical costs incurred to the time of 
her husband's death. She appealed the decision, contending that her husband 
was not an employee, because his help was gratuitous, and because there was 
no specific contract of employment, orders or salary. The court affirmed the 
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award on the strength of the fact that her husband had been paid The second 
part of her argument, concerning lack of specific contract, orders or salary was 
irrelevant, because it went to the question of whether he was an independent 
contractor, a contention which was inconsistent with her gratuity argument 
New Mexico Trembath v Riggs, 100 N M 615, 673 P 2d 1348 (1983), infra 
§ 48 10 n36 
New York Smith v Valentine Estates, Inc , 357 N Y S 2d 150 (App Di\ 
1974) The claimant, aged 10, was struck by a rock thrown by an 11 year-old 
companion while at the construction site He maintained that an employer-
employee relationship existed, since he had allegedly been promised money for 
doing odd jobs The supervisor said that the claimant had been promised money 
"for not damaging the property n The board held that no employer-employee 
relationship existed, and the court held that the factual issue was for the board 
to resolve 
Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board v American Mutual 
Liability Insurance Co , 19 Pa Commw 582, 339 A 2d 183 (1975) A sales 
representative of a paper company sold industrial packaging within a 25 mile 
radius of Philadelphia, drrving his own vehicle to call upon customers When 
the salesman's vision deteriorated, he hired a driver with his employer s 
knowledge The salesman paid the driver himself, but his employer's sales 
manager reserved the right to tell the salesman and his driver where and when 
to go on their route When the driver was injured in an accident in the course 
of his employment, he sought compensation from the paper company The court 
ordered compensation It held that the company's right to control made the 
driver its employee, notwithstanding that the salesman did the actual hiring and 
the company was not obligated to pay the driver 
See also Stewart v Uryc, 237 Pa Super 258, 352 A 2d 465 (1975) The 
plaintiff, a minor, was injured when he was dragged under the defendant s truck 
This suit in trespass ensued The minor plaintiff worked for the defendant on 
his garbage truck not by contract but bv tacit understanding, when he pleased, 
and without regular remuneration The defendant failed to carry the minor 
plaintiff on his payroll and did not pay social security taxes or carry workman's 
compensation insurance for him The court reversed the dismissal of the 
plaintiffs tort action due to the supposed exclusivity of remedies under the 
Workmen's Compensation Act, ruling that in light of the facts, no master-servant 
or employer-employee relationship existed between the defendant and minor 
plaintiff 
South Carolina McCreery v Covenant Presbyterian Church, 299 S C 218, 
383 S E 2d 264 (1989) During the construction of a church, a volunteer was 
injured The injury was treated as a compensable claim, with a notice of injury 
being filed with the compensation carrier and some investigation of the underly-
ing facts Ultimately, the parties entered into a settlement agreement which was 
approved by the Commission Later the carrier stopped making payments 
pursuant to the agreement, contending that the Commission had no jurisdiction 
to approve the settlement, that the injured party was not an employee as defined 
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Note that, so long as there is some kind of pay, it is not essential 
that the payment come from the employer. In State Compensation 
Ins. Fund v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n l l a special nurse was found 
by the compensation act and hence, there was no case to adjudicate. The 
Commission approved an order of the single commissioner which held the church 
was estopped to make such a defense and the circuit court affirmed. The court 
of appeals reversed. Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon the 
Commission by agreement between the parties. The Commission could have no 
jurisdiction over the agreement if it had no jurisdiction over the underlying 
claim. Here the injured party was not an employee of the church since there 
was no contract for hire. There was no evidence of any employment relationship. 
South Dakota: Kubik v. Farmer's Union Oil Co., 209 N.W.2d 551 (S.D. 1973). 
Plaintiff, a customer at defendant's place of business, was asked by an employee 
of defendant to drop by on his way home and deliver a propane tank to one of 
his neighbors. Plaintiff, who was not on defendant's payroll and was at defen-
dant's place of business only to make a purchase, agreed and attempted to load 
the tank alone, injuring his foot. It was held that plaintiff was a "gratuitous 
employee," and as such not eligible for workmen's compensation. 
Virginia: Charlottesville Music Center v. McCray, 215 Va. 31, 205 S.E.2d 674 
(1974). A 15-year-old boy who was killed while helping his friend erect shelves, 
and who did not expect any payment for his services, was not under a "contract 
for hire" and therefore was not an employee for purposes of the Virginia 
Workmen's Compensation Act. Treatise quoted. 
Wisconsin: Klusendorf Chevrolet-Buick, Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Review 
Comm'n, 110 Wis. App. 328, 328 N.W.2d 890 (1982). Klosterman who had 
previously worked for Klusendorf, took his car to Klusendorf s garage for 
repairs. While he was waiting for the repair work to be finished, Klosterman 
and a Klusendorf employee were told that two cars had to be driven to another 
city and that only one employee was available to do the driving. Klosterman 
volunteered to drive the second vehicle and the service manager accepted this 
offer. Klosterman was killed in an automobile accident while on the trip. The 
court of appeals held that Klosterman was not an employee at the time of the 
accident since there was no arrangement for wages. The court rejected the 
arguments that the "for hire" requirement of the statute was fulfilled by either 
Klosterman's "hope" that he would be reemployed by Klusendorf or by Klusen-
dorf s cancellation of Klosterman's repair bill after the accident. Treatise 
quoted. 
Revels v. Industrial Comm'n, 36 Wis. 2d 395, 153 N.W.2d 637 (1967). 
Defendant's main work was hauling milk, but on occasion he carried logs on 
his truck for a lumber mill. His brother assisted him on one occasion, apparently 
to "get some exercise," since he was no longer working because of a disability. 
The brother did little work, no wages were discussed, and defendant would have 
done all the work himself if his brother had not gone along. Held: The brother 
was not an employee, and fatal injuries suffered while unloading the truck were 
not compensable. 
" 124 Cal. App. 2d 1, 268 P.2d 40 (1954), § 45.32(a) n.22 supra. 
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to be an employee of the hospital although her pay came from a 
private foundation; and in Claremont Country Club v. Industrial 
Ace. Comm 'n, l2 a caddy was held to be an employee of a country 
club although he was paid by individual members. 
Nor is it even necessary that the pay go to the employee. For 
example a nun working in a parochial school was held to be an 
employee although payment for her services was made to the order 
of which she was member.1-3 
1.2 174 Cal. 395, 163 P. 209 (1917). See also § 48 infra on source of payment 
in lent employee cases. 
1-3 Sister Odelia v. Church of St. Andrew, 195 Minn. 357, 263 N.W. I l l 
(1935). 
See also the following cases: 
Iowa: Sister Mary Benedict v. St. Mary's Corp., 255 Iowa 847, 124 N.W.2d 
548 (1963). A nun was held to be an employee of the parochial school corporation 
where she served as a teacher and secretary-treasurer of the school convent. 
Missouri: Fielder v. Production Credit Ass'n, 429 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1968). Claimant and her husband worked together on janitorial work, getting 
one salary and, for record purposes, appearing on the books in the name of the 
husband. There was evidence that the man who engaged them knew of this 
arrangement and had ostensible if not actual authority to hire. There was also 
evidence that they had been given specific direction to do certain special or extra 
items of work. The court indicated that a contract to pay wages was not 
absolutely indispensable, and that alternatively claimant could be called an 
employee as a result of "appointment" rather than contract. An award to the 
claimant for a fall resulting in osteoporosis was sustained. 
New Jersey: Pickett v. Tryon Trucking Co., 214 N.J. Super. 76, 518 A.2d 503 
(1986). The claimant drove a tractor-trailer owned by a third party and leased 
exclusively to Tryon. When the claimant's tractor-trailer broke down while 
hauling a load for Tryon, the claimant engaged another driver to complete the 
trip. While transferring the tractor-trailer's load, the claimant was injured. 
Since the claimant was not being paid for his services at the time of the accident, 
the judge below denied compensation. This court reversed, holding that financial 
consideration need not be paid to the person performing the service in order 
to qualify as an employee. Tryon's financial and business interests were 
promoted by the claimant's activities in arranging for another driver to complete 
the haul. The claimant was rendering services for Tryon when injured, and the 
parties had a regular employment relationship. Tryon was liable for compensa-
tion. 
Oregon: Whitlock v. State Indus. Ace. Comm'n, 233 Or. 166, 377 P.2d 148 
(1962). The owners of a ski resort paid $125 to a chapter of the Future Farmers 
of America to have the Summit House painted by the members of the chapter. 
The resort owners were held liable for compensation benefits payable to one of 
the boys who suffered lead poisoning while painting. The court explained that 
(Matthew Bender A Co.. Inc.) ' (Rel.63-6/91 Pub.340) 
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Although, as the next subparagraph will show, the performance 
and acceptance of valuable service normally raises an implication 
that payment for the services is expected, this implication does 
not arise when the circumstances negative such an expectation. 
This occurs in at least three common situations. 
§ 47.41(a) Public-service or charitable duties 
The performance of voluntary public-service or charitable du-
ties ordinarily leads to no presumption of expected payment. A 
professional dancer and radio artist volunteered to act as a 
hostess at a servicemen's canteen. An irrepressible marine, with 
whom she had consented to dance, took a firm grip on her arm 
in the process of unfolding a complex jitterbug routine, and threw 
her spinning through the air, evidently expecting to catch her. He 
omitted to do so, however, having himself in the meantime hit a 
table, and the hostess fell to the floor, sustaining injuries. The 
court, in an opinion containing a good collection of the authorities 
in the field, held that she was not an employee under the Compen-
sation Act, and was therefore not barred by the exclusive remedy 
clause of the Act from bringing a damage suit against the canteen 
based on its failure to protect her from boisterous and disorderly 
persons.2 A similar result has been reached as to a carpenter 
the claimant had a prerogative of assigning his share of the proceeds to the 
organization. Treatise quoted. 
2 Edwards v. Hollywood Canteen, 160 P.2d 94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1945), aff'd, 
27 Cal. 2d 802, 167 P.2d 729 (1946). 
Cf. McNicholas v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. 111. 1964). A 
volunteer was injured while entertaining patients at a V.A. hospital. The Federal 
Employees' Compensation Act (U.S.C.A. § 790(b)(4)) provides coverage for 
persons who furnish services, without compensation, provided acceptance of such 
services is authorized by an Act of Congress. Acceptance of the volunteer's 
services was authorized; therefore she was a covered employee. Action under 
Tort Claims Act dismissed. 
And cf. Levine v. United States, 478 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Mass. 1979). The 
claimant, a volunteer worker at a Veterans Administration hospital, was injured 
when she tripped over a raised doorway. Claimant's supervisor filed a claim for 
an award under the FECA. Claimant did not sign that claim, nor did she accept 
the FECA award upon receiving it. She did, however, appeal the amount of that 
award. Claimant filed a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The court held 
that, because claimant was a federal employee, the FECA action was her 
exclusive remedy. 
And cf. TerKeurst v. United States, 549 F. Supp. 455 (W.D. Mich. 1982), 
§ 47.41 n.100 supra. 
(Matihcw Bender Sc Co., Inc.) (Rel.63-6/91 Pub.340) 
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injured while donating his services to the Red Cross,3 a person 
volunteering to act as a guard during a liberty bond drive,4 a 
schoolteacher assisting in the issuance of war-ration books,5 a 
member donating his services in the construction of a Grange 
hall,6 a person voluntarily participating in a carnival for prospec-
tive students of a university,7 the volunteer manager of the Little 
Bigger League Team,8 a parent helping out at a Boy Scout 
dinner,81 an unpaid member of the state civil defense program,9 
(Text continued on page 8-356) 
3 Hitchcock v. American Red Cross, 6 Cal. I.A.C. 58 (1919). 
Contra Stegeman v St. Francis Xavier Parish, 611 S.W.2d 204 (Mo. 1981) 
(en banc). Claimant, a volunteer worker, was injured on his first day of work 
on the construction of a private school gymnasium. He was held to be an 
employee "under any appointment," under the Missouri definition. Although an 
"uncompensated worker," he was entitled to benefits based on the average annual 
earnings of an adult in the same class of employment. Treatise quoted in majority 
and dissent. 
•Vest v Shaul, 10 Cal I A.C. 292 (1922). 
* Bituminous Cas. Co v Industrial Comm'n, 245 Wis 337, 13 N.W 2d 925 
(1944) 
•Smith v State Indus. Ace. Comm'n, 144 Or. 480, 23 P 2d 904 (1933). 
7
 Athletic Ass'n of University of Illinois v Industrial Comm'n, 384 111 208, 
51 N E 2d 157 (1943) 
•Cemigha v City of Passaic, 50 N.J. Super 201, 141 A 2d 558 (1958) 
Volunteer manager held not to be an employee of the city even though the 
recreational director said that he would do all in his power to see that the 
manager, a dry cleaner, would get the job of cleaning the uniforms at the end 
of the year. Treatise cited. 
See also Cardello v Mt Herman Ski Area, Inc., 372 A.2d 579 (Me. 1977). 
The claimant was injured while working as a National Ski Patroller on the 
appellee's slope. The National Ski Patrol is a voluntary organization which 
patrols ski areas to prevent accidents and render first-aid treatment. Patrollers 
are hired, trained, and scheduled by ski patrol leaders responsible to directors 
of the National Ski Patrol. Ski area operators could not manage patrollers or 
fire them. The appellee ski operator gave its patrollers free beverages, and gave 
them and their family members reduced rates. The court, assuming the claimant 
was not a purely gratuitous worker, upheld the denial of his claim on the ground 
the claimant was not an employee of the appellee. The appellee had no right 
to control and direct the claimant in the performance of his duties Treatise cited. 
• * Preese v. Boy Scouts of Am., 167 N W 2d 737 (Minn. 1969) Claimant was 
injured while working at a dinner held by the Boy Scouts She received no pay 
for her work at the dinner, but claimed that because of the benefits inuring to 
the parents of the Scouts, she was in fact an employee of the Scout Council. 
Claimant held to be a volunteer and not entitled to compensation benefits. 
Treatise cited. 
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